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ROBERT WARD 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza 
340 East 2nd North Street 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-4412 
Facsimile: (208) 587-3144 
Idaho State Bar Number 4442 
~J ~t E 9.M. 
OCT 2 1 2009 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T EARLS, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
and spouse (if any), LIO BALDO GARZA, an 
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I 
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS 
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED 
IN EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN 
AS 29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF 011t0£E,) 
Case No. CV09-8175 
AFFIDAVIT OF BERNARDINO 
BARRAZA 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
That I am the Defendant in the above-entitled action and I make this affidavit based 
upon my own personal knowledge and belief. All statements provided herein are true and 
correct to the best of my knowledge, and I am competent to testify to the matters as stated 
herein. 
1. On March 6, 2001, Juan Manuel Cuevas sold the real property commonly 
AFFIDAVIT OF BERNARDINO BARRAZA l 0001-70 
I I 
known as 29452 Pearl Road, Parma, Idaho, (the "real property") to me per written contract. 
2. On May 6, 2002, I recorded a lien with the Canyon County Recorder's 
Office against the real property since Juan Manuel Cuevas failed to transfer title of said 
real property to me. 
3. Prior to Juan Manuel Cuevas initiating any legal action, Plaintiff, Wilfrido 
Cuevas, called me and requested copies of payments and any documents I had in my 
possession regarding the transaction between Juan Manuel Cuevas and myself with 
reference to the real property. 
4. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, told me that Juan Manuel Cuevas was now 
wanting to sell the real property to him and that Wilfrido knew that Juan Manuel Cuevas 
had previously sold the real property to me. 
5. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, told me that I should demand a refund of all 
monies paid to Juan Manuel Cuevas for the real property, so that Wilfrido could buy the 
real property instead. 
6. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, and I discussed retaining an attorney to ensure 
that Juan Manuel Cuevas was fair and dealing honestly with both parties. 
7. I went to meet with Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, about three (3) days after our 
conversation but Wilfrido refused to speak with me. 
8. My attorney, Robert Ward, and I called Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, shortly 
thereafter. Wilfrido stated in his conversation with Robert and I, that I had lost all rights to 
the real property per the Statute of Limitations. Wilfrido further stated that he was no 
longer interested in retaining an attorney to deal with the purchase of the real property from 
Juan Manuel Cuevas, and was at that time renting and maintaining the real property since it 
AFFIDAVIT OF BERNARDINO BARRAZA - 2 0001.71. 
I< 
belonged to Juan Manuel Cuevas. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, said that Juan Manuel 
Cuevas was family, and that he no longer wanted to discuss the real property issue with me. 
9. On April 2, 2007, a quiet title action commenced on the real property 
between Juan Manuel Cuevas and me. 
10. In May of 2007. Juan Manuel Cuevas obtained a default judgment on the 
real property which was timely set aside by the Idaho Court of Appeals. 
11. May 24, 2007, I filed my Answer and Counterclaim with the court attached 
to the Affidavit of Counsel. 
12. My Answer and Counterclaim alleged quiet title as a cause of action. 
13. My Answer and Counterclaim was filed in the manner as required by 
I.R.C.P. S(d) and (e). 
14. My Answer and Counterclaim was served upon Juan Manuel Cuevas as 
evidenced by the Certificate of Mailing, on May 23, 2007, in a manner as required by 
I.R.C.P. S(a) and (b). 
15. On June 20, 2007, while the appeal process was pending, Juan Manual 
Cuevas apparently quitclaimed his interest in the real property to Plaintiff, Wilfrido 
Cuevas. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas', own affidavit states that he was aware of the lawsuit 
and my claims. He also stated in his affidavit that he was aware of my recorded lien and 
that he went to the title company to search records. It is my understanding and belief, that 
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, was aware at this time that Juan Manuel Cuevas could not give 
clear title to the real property. I believe a quitclaim deed was executed between Juan 
Manuel Cuevas and Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, because they couldn't get a clear title 
through the title company. 
AFFIDAVIT OF BERNARDINO BARRAZA - 3 0001.72 
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16. On June 24, 2008, the Idaho Court of Appeals entered its Opinion, granting 
my Motion to Set Aside Juan Manuel Cuevas' default judgment. 
17. On January 15, 2009, Mark D. Perison, attorney for Juan Manuel Cuevas, 
withdraws as attorney of record. 
18. On March 17, 2009, I obtained a quiet title judgment to the real property. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NOT. 
DATED This ;21) day of October, 2009. 
De O:::Zc,.rcb fa c A c.,y .--c 2 S 
Bernardino Barraza 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this o2J) day of October, 2009. 
AFFIDAVIT OF BERNARDINO BARRAZA - 4 Q Q Q 1_ ( 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that upon the~ day of October, 2009, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza by the method indicated 
below, addressed to the following: 
REBECCA A. RAINEY 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK 
& FIELDS, CHTD. 
P.O. BOX829 
BOISE, ID 83701 
FAX: (208) 385-5384 
AFFIDAVITOFBERNARDINOBARRAZA-5 0001-74 
Vu.S.Mail --
Hand Delivered 
-~Overnight Mail 
FAX _,,___ 
1 ' 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
0001.77 
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' ' 
INSTRUMENT NO. ~oo 0-c)...0!:>'!3 CLAIM oF LIEN 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF Cany:on, · ) 
BEFORE ME. the undersigned Notary Public, personally appeared Bernardino Barraza and 
L~i::..:o:.:b:.;:a:..::l:.:d~o--=-G=-a=-"rz:;.;a:::...... __ _,, who being first duly sworn, says that he is the lienor herein or the 
agcntofthclienorherein, whoseaddressis 16558 Blue Spruce Rd. Nampa, Id, 83,651. 
and that in accordance with a contract with Juan Manuel Cuevas. 
lieno~ furnished labor, services or ~terials consisting of unpaid rgfund in the ama\Jnt 
$20.000.00 for the payments oi R~al estate Title, 
on the following described real property in Canyon County, State ofldaho, and more fully 
described as "Exibit A" Attched and made part hereof. • 
and owned by Juan Manuel Cuevas and Yrene Baez sigle persons. 
for a total value of Twenty thousand dlls and 00/100 dollars (~0.000,~0 
of which there remains unpaid Twenty thousand d11s and 00/lO~ollars (SZO. ooo, ai.o 
That the lienor furnished the first of the items on the fifth dayo~anuary , 200.£.. 
and that ~e licnor furnished the last of the items on the fifth day of January 200.L, 
That the lienor served copies of the notice on the contractor on the 7th day ofinarch . 2002, 
I 
20Q_by ____________ ...;, and on the subcontractor on the ___ day of 
_____ _,200_by _______ ~~~-r-----7':h 
WI seal. 
: Namp§, Id, 83651. · 
My Commission expires: 10/02/07. 
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EXHIBIT ''C'' 
000180 
. r ' 
Mark D. Perison, Bar No. 4804 
MARK D. PERISON, P.A. 
314 S. 9th Street, Suite 300 
P. 0. Box 657 5 
Boise, Idaho 83707-6575 
Telephone: (208) 331-1200 
Fax: (208) 343-5838 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
F I A.~r:fu 9M. 
A?~ o 2 2007 
ttANVON COUNTY CLERK 
... D. BUTLER, DEPUTY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
JUAN MANUEL CUEVAS and ) 
YRENE BAEZ, individuals ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
) 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an ) 
individual, LIOBALDO GARZA, ) 
an individual, and DOES I ) 
through X, unknown claimants to ) 
the real property described in ) 
Exhibit "A" hereto, commonly ) 
known as 29452 Pearl Road, ) 
Parma, Idaho, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
) 
Case No. ~I} 0 7 r J 53 {o 
COMPLAINT TO QUIET TITLE 
AND FOR DAMAGES 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs herein, by and through its counsel of record, and 
COMPI.AINT TO QUIET TITLE -- Page I 
000:18:1 
I ' 
.. ,· 
complains and alleges as follows: 
I. 
Plaintiff Juan Manuel Cuevas is an individual currently residing in Arizona. 
Yrene Baez is an individual currently residing in Arizona. Cuevas and Baez are 
owners of real property located in Canyon County, more particularly described in 
Exhibit "A" hereto, that is the subject of this action. This parcel shall be referred to 
herein as "the Property" and is commonly known as 29452 Pearl Road, Parma, 
Idaho. 
II. 
Defendant Bernardino Barraza and Defendant Liobaldo Garza are individuals 
whose current residence address is unknown to Plaintiffs. 
III. 
The subject matter of this suit is real property located in Canyon County, 
Idaho, which is more particularly described on Exhibit "A" hereto. Defendants claim 
an interest in said property and jurisdiction is therefore appropriate under Idaho 
Code§ 5-514. 
IV. 
Defendants DOES I through X are persons or entities whose true names 
and identities are unknown to Plaintiff and who have or may assert some claim to the 
Property. Plaintiff shall substitute the true names and identies of such parties upon 
their discovery pursuant to I.R.C.P. I0(a)(4). 
COMPIAINT TO QUIET TITLE -- Page 2 
0001.82 
'I : 
' . '  \ 
V. 
This action is a request for a judgment quieting title in Plaintiffs to property 
located in Canyon County, the value of which exceeds $10,000.00, therefore venue is 
proper in the District Court of the Third Judicial District, Canyon County. 
VI. 
On May 6, 2002, Defendants recorded a lien against the subject property as 
Instrument No. 200220593 in the County Recorder's Office of Canyon County. A 
copy of the lien is attached hereto as Exhibit "B." According the lien, a notice of the 
claim upon which the lien was based was served upon the "contractor" on March 7, 
2002. 
VII. 
The lien filed by Defendants asserts a claim against the Property for unpaid 
amounts claimed due for "labor, services or materials consisting of unpaid refund in 
the amount $20,000.00 for the payments on Real estate Title." 
VIII. 
Plaintiffs have disputed that any such amounts are due or that Defendants 
have a right under any law of the State of Idaho to file such lien. 
COUNTONE 
( Quiet Title) 
IX. 
To date, no foreclosure action has been commenced by Defendants to foreclose 
the lien. 
COMPLAINT TO QUIET TITLE -· Page 3 
000'.183 
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X. 
Although it is unclear to Plaintiff the exact nature of the lien, it appears to be 
based either upon the mechanic's lien statutes of the State of Idaho, Idaho Code 
§ 45-501, et seq. or upon a claim of breach of contract. 
XI. 
The filing of a foreclosure action if the lien is a mechanic's lien is barred by 
Idaho Code § 45-510 and, according to that code section, said lien has expired. 
XII. 
If the lien is based upon an alleged breach of contract, an action to enforce 
that contract, whether or written or oral, has expired by the passage of more than five 
(5) years since the accrual of the cause of action and is barred pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 5-216 and/or Idaho Code §5-217. In the lien, the Defendants note that they 
served copies of their lien on "the_contractor" (identified as Plaintiff Juan Manuel 
Cuevas) on March 7, 2002. Because Defendants knew of the existence of the claim 
at least by that date, and have failed to act within five (5) years, said claim is now 
barred. 
XIII. 
The continued existence of the lien upon the Property constitutes an unlawful 
cloud upon the title of Plaintiffs. 
XIX 
Plaintiffs have previously demanded that Defendants remove the lien from the 
COMPLAINT TO QUIET TITLE -- Page 4 
0001.84 
record because it constitutes an unlawful cloud upon Plaintiffs' title and Defendants 
have refused. 
xv. 
Plaintiff seeks a judgment of this Court quieting title in the name of Plaintiff 
and against all other claimants once notice to such potential claimants has been 
provided. 
XVI. 
Defendants refusal to release the subject lien is frivolous and without legal 
justification, making an award of attorney fees appropriate under Idaho Code§ 12-
121 and 12-123. 
COUNTTWO 
(Slander of Title) 
XVII. 
The claim of lien filed by Defendants was filed without a legal basis for doing 
so and was done for the sole purpose of slandering the title of Plaintiffs in order to 
extract some advantage therefrom. 
XVIII. 
The filing of the lien constitutes a slander upon Plaintiffs title for which 
Plaintiff should be awarded damages. 
XIX. 
The slander upon Plaintiff's title was done frivolously and without legal 
justification and an award of attorney fees is therefore appropriate under LC. § 12-
COMPLAINT TO QUIET TITLE -- Page 5 
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' ' 
121 and/or 12-123. An award of fees in the amount of $5,000.00 is an appropriate 
amount should judgment be taken by default. 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for a Judgment from this Court as follows: 
I. For Judgment and Decree of the Court declaring that the lien of 
Defendants is for all purposes released from the property to the same extent as if 
Defendants had executed a voluntary release. 
2. For Judgment quieting title against any other claimant (currently Does I 
through X) subsequently identified as an entity claiming an interest in the Property. 
3. For entry of Judgment against Defendants in an amount to be proven at 
trial for slander of Plaintiffs title. 
4. For an award of Plaintiffs' attorney fees. 
5. For an award of Plaintiffs costs. 
6. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 
Dated: March/' ~2007. 
COMPWNT TO QUIET TITLE -- Page 6 
MARKD. PERISON, P.A 
0001.86 
erison •• Of the Firm 
s for Plaintiffs 
' : 
A part of the Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter, Section 19, Township 6 
North, Ra11ge 5 West, Boise Merjdian, Canyon County, Idaho, more p11rtJcularfy 
described to-wit: 
Com1ne11clng at the Southwest corner of the Southwest Quarter of the Southeast 
Quarter, Section 19, Township 6 North, Range 5 West, Boise Meridian; the 
INITIAL POINT of thJs description; thence 
North 0°07' East 924 feet, along the West line of the s11id Southwest Quarter of the 
Southeast Quarter; thence 
South 55°15' East 336.82 feet; thence 
South 0°07' West 730 feet, parallel to the said West line, to a point on the South line 
of the said S01dhwest Quarter .of the Southeast Quarter; thence 
South 89°35' West 277.15 feet, along the said South line to tbe INITIAL POINT OF 
THIS DESCIUPTIQN. 
EXHIBIT A 
000187 
# • ·M..,. 
INSTRUMENT NO. -;;..oo ?).d--.. 0!::>'13 CLAIM oF LIEN 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF Canyon. · ) 
BEFORE ME, the undersigned Notary Public. personally appeared Bernardino Barraza artd 
L_i;a.;;o_b;.;:;a..=l:...:::d=o.._;.G=a;..rz=-a"'--__ _,, who being first duly sworn, says that he is the lienor herein or the 
agentofthelienorherein, whoseaddressis 16558 Blue Spruce Rd. Nampa, Id, 83,651. 
and that in accordance with a contract with Juan Manuel Cuevas. 
licnor furnished labor, services or m~terials consisting of unpaid refund in the amount 
$20.000.00 for the payments o~ R~al estate Title, 
on the following described real property in Canyon County, State ofldaho, and more fully 
described as 11 Exibit 1\" Attched and made part hereof. 
and owned by Juan Manuel Cuevas and Yrene Baez sigle persons. 
for a total value of Twenty thousand dlls and 00/100 dollars (~o, ooo. !P,O 
of which there remains unpaid Twenty thousand dlls and 00/lOQloJJars (~0.000,(1).0 
That the lienor furnished the first of the items on the fifth dayofJanuary • 2002... 
and that ~e licnor furnished the last of the items on the fifth day of January , 200.1.... 
That the lienor served copies of the notice on the contractor on the 7th day ofinarch . 20~2 , 
200-_bt ____________ _. and on the subcontractor on the ___ day of 
______ , 200_ by _______ -:----,,....._,.._.------r.-:b. 
EXHIBIT B 
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I . ' -.. • . "'"'\ 
., ..,,,. ............. \ __ _ ·~..,; 
,, A\\ 
1 A p1rl of the SouthweH Qunttr of the 5fl11thent Quarter, 5ectinn l9, Tnwn~nlc;, 6 tcortt., 
I ~:;;;~.;;::;~;:;;;;:;.~~;:::';;:;:~;,:~;;:;;,;;::;;;;;:;:~;;::;::;;;;,  
d,Jcrlptlon1 thence · · ! l!~rth o·aegrees 07' East 924 f~t. •Jc:ng the West ll~e of -t.ht utd Soutt1we&t _Qu,rtP., 
~- · 11 af ·ti.t S0Ythe1st Qusrt:~; th;nce · 
U S1>11tt. 55 dcgrcci 15' E,st ll&.82 fee; thence 
II ·!louth C degreu 07' ·west 730 fttt, parallel to ihe said Wut llnl!, to• pl'tnt on the 
It South line of the u1d Southwest Quarter of the Southtut ou~rtrr; thente 
II 
South 89 degrees 35' \lest 277,16 feet, 110119 the uid South Hne to the lNJllf; . POINT 
Of THIS DESCRIPTION, 
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EXHIBIT "D" 
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I ' .. , . . 
fttcommo\7A1tbN 
Mark D. Perlson, Bar No. 4804 
MARK D. PERISON, PA. 
314 S. 9th Street, Suite 300 
P. 0. Box 6575 
Boise, Idaho 83707-6575 
Telephone: (208) 331-1200 
Fax: (208) 343-5838 
200703398 
2~01 rmv 17 Prl ll 2s 
JUAN MANUEL CUEVAS and ) 
YRENE BAEZ, individuals ) 
F ~.l,-1h_9 
.M. 
MAY 152007 
CANYON CQur..iry I"'! 
J HSIDf:MA" It "'LEAK N,Ot!f*U'f'Y 
) Case No. CV07-3536 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
) 
BERNARDINO~ an ) 
individual, LIOBALDO GARZA, ) 
an individual, and DOES I ) 
through X, unknown claimants to ) 
the real property described in ) 
Exhibit "A" hereto, commonly ) 
known as 29452 Pearl Road, ) 
Parma, Idaho, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
) 
JUDGMENT 
The Defendants and each of them having been regularly served with process 
and having failed to answer within the time limited therefor by law, and the default 
JUDGMENT - Page I 
0001.91 
. ' .. 
of each such Defendant having been entered herein; 
NOW, TIIBREFORE, Upon application of coW1sel for the Plaintiff, and upon 
the Affidavit of Plaintiffs counsel that none of the Defendants is an infant or an 
incompetent person, nor now in the active military service of the United States of 
America; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED As follows: 
Title to the real property set forth in Exhibit "A" hereto, and commonly 
known as commonly known as 29452 Pearl Rnad, Parma, Idaho, is qui~ted in the 
name of JUAN MANUEL CUEVAS and YRENE BAEZ, as against the claim asserted 
by Defendants BERNARDINO BARRAZA and LIOBALDO GARZA in Instrument 
No. 200220593, Official Records of Canyon County and said Instrument is hereby 
RELEASED from the property for all pw:poses to the same extent as if Defendants 
had executed a voluntary release, and Defendants BERNARDINO BARRAZA and 
LIOBAIDO GARZA shall have no further right. title or interest in and to the real 
property described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
DATED: This __lL day of May, 2007. 
RENAE HOFF 
JUDGMENT-· Page 2 
0001-92 
. ' .. . . 
' . . 
A part of tbe Southwest Quarter of tho Southeast Quarter, Section 19, Township 6 
North, Range 5 West, BoJBe Meridian, Canyon County, IMho, more pnrticularly 
described to-wit: 
Commencing nt the Southwest corner of the Southwest Quarter of tho Southeast 
Quarter, Section 19, Township 6 North, Range 5 West, Boise Meridian; the 
INITIAL POINT of this description; thence 
North 0°07' East 924 feet, nlong the West Une of the said Southwest Quartw of the· 
Southeast Quarter; thence 
South 55915' East 336.~ feet; tflence 
South 0°07' West 730 feet, parallel to the said West line, to II point on the South line 
of tbe said Soothweat Quarter of the Southeast Quarter; thence 
South 89°35' West 277 JS feet, along the said South line to the INmAL POINT OF 
THIS DESCRIPTIQN. 
EXHIBIT A 
0001.93 
EXHIBIT "E" 
0001.94 
'' 
ROBERT WARD 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
Attorneys far Defendant Bernardino Barraza 
340 East 2nd North Street 
M00.ntairt. Honn,, Idaho 8364 7 
Telepbone: (Zl)&} 5.$7:.4412 
Facsimile: (208) 58.7-3144 
Idaho State Bar Number 4442 
F I L ·-- E. g 
-----AMI-! I t.J PM. 
MAY th -;IDW 
CANYON COONJY CLERK 
b.SUTLE::R.DEPOTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF CANYON 
JUAN MANUEL CUEVAS and YR.ENE 
BAEZ, individuals, 
P taintifts, 
vs. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual, 
LIOBALDO GARZ~ an individual, and 
DOES I thro.ugh X, unknown claimants to the 
real pt-0J>efty·descmbMJn Exhibit '~A'', 
commonly known as- 29452 PeatLRoa4, 
P~I~, 
STA TE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF ELMORE ) 
1, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
} 
Case No. CV -07-3.536 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
PURSUANT TO RULE 60~) 
ROBERT WARD, bein,g first duly swo~ deposes and states as follows: 
L That I am the Attorney for the Defendant Bernardino B~ in the above-
entitled actiort. I make this Affidavit in Support of Defendant's Modon to Set Aside 
Default Judgment Rursuant tQ Rule 60(b ). 
2. That Defendant discussed this· case with me, and paid me for my legal advice; 
however, at that tune. no lawsuit was filed a1lQ. tlrerefore I could not file a Notice of 
Appearance on behalf of Defendant. 
~0Rl6INAL 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT'OF MOTJO{jTOSSTASlDB JUDGMENT PlJRSUANT T0 
RULE OO(b J - 1 
000195 
3. A Complairit was later filed and Defendant was served with the Complaint, but 
did not tell :m¢,_ thus, rte> Answer and Colil1tetclaim was filed. 
4. Defendant believed that I was representing him after our· di~cussfons regatdfog 
the case, and therefore had the mistaken belief that he did not need to let me know that a 
lawsuit had been filed and a lady had. given him papers as service of process. 
5. De&niant ~ales very little Englisli, cartrtot read. or write English, and thus did 
not understand the netice in the. Summons requiririg, hhn to m~ a. -r~ponsive pl~ding 
within twenty (20) days. 
6. Defendant has a meritorious def~use as outlined in the proposed Answer and 
Coumerelabn attached hereto, and inoorporated.·as if set forth infull hereu,.._ 
7. Defendant respectfully requests the Court to set aside the default judgment 
entered m this ease and allow Defendant to file the Answer and. Counterclaitn attached 
.FURTHER., YOUR AFFIANT SArTH: NAUG:ftf . 
. DA~ 1hls• ~l;- day of May, 2007.. 
HALL,,FRIEDL¥ -~ WARD 
AFf'ltJAYIT OF COUNSEL iN SUPPOR-TOFMOTION TO SET ASIDE JUOOMENTPURSUANT TO 
RULE 60(b)- 2. 
0001.96 
CERTlFitATE ~:S~YICE 
I Hl!REBY CBR.11FY that upon the ~of May, 201l1, l <!lulled to be setved 
a true a:nd correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit ofCounsel in Support of Motion to Set 
Aside Juqgtnent Pursuant to Rule 60(b) by the method indicated below, addressed to the 
following: 
MARK D. PERTSON, P.A. 
3149 S. 9TH STREET, SUITE 300 
P . .O. Bo~ 6575 
BOISE, ID 83 701-6575 
(208) 331 ... 1200 
(208) 34J ... 583'8 FAX 
/U.S.Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
FAX 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MonoN TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO 
RULE 60(b)-j 
000197 
ROBERT WARD 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza 
3:40 East 2nd North Street 
Nfum.·. 'tam Honie Idaho 83647 . . ... , .. 
telephone.: (l08) 581-4412' 
Facsimile:· (208) 587-3144 
Idaho State Bar Number 4442 
IN TI-IE D1STRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JtIDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF CANYON 
JUAN MANtJBL CUEVAS and YRENE 
BABZ individuals t . . . . ., 
Plaintiffs. 
' 
vs. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual, 
LIOBALDO GARZA;. an individual, and 
DOBB I through X, unknown claimants to the 
real PI"Operty .deseti:bed. in :Exhibit ''AJ', 
eW.tmiOtdy knt>wn,as 29452 Pearl Roa~ 
Panna,Jdah'o, 
Defendants. 
.,. 
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ANSWER 
Case No. CV-07-3536 
ANSWB:RAND 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Fee Category; J(8)(a) 
Fee: $.62.00 
COMES NOW, Defendant Bernardino Barraza., by and thro.ugh his attorney of 
record., Robert Ward of the firm Hall, Friedly & Ward, and in answer to the Complaint 
fi:led herein by the Plaintiffs, admits, denies and alleges as foHows; 
AASWE& ANO COUNTERCLAIM - I 
0001.98 
I' 
I. 
The Defeooa,nt denies each and every allegation of the Complaint not hereinafter 
specifically admitted. 
IL 
Defendant adttn'ts the allegations contained in paragra~ m, IV, V, VI, VII, IX, X 
and XI of Plaintiffs1 Complaint to Quiet Title. 
m. 
Defenda,rit.denies the' allegations contamediD.paragraphs II, :xIIi xrrt XIV, XVI~ 
XVII, XVIIl and XIX.of Plaintiffs' Complaint t:e Quiet Title~ 
IV. 
Itt response to paragraph I of Plaintiffil Complaint to Quiet Titlt, Defeedant admits 
only that Plaintiff Juan Manuel Cuevas is an individual cunently residing in Arizona, and 
tha,t Pl~ti.tf Yttn~ Baez is an irulividual currently residing in Arizona. Defendant denies 
V. 
In response to paragraph VIIl of Plaintiffs' Complaint to Quiet Title, Defendant 
~ only tha.t PlamtUfa' dispute tha¢ they owe Defendant rnoner, and deirles the 
VI. 
, 
fn respollSe to paragraph XV of Plaintiffs.' Complaint to Quiet Title, Defendant . 
admits only that Plaintiff seeks Quiet Title, and denies the remainder of said paragraph. 
0001.99 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs sold to Defendant the Property as descri®dill. Plaintiffs; CornpJaintto 
Quiet Title;, Therefore, Defendant is the owner of'the property>and not Plaintiffs. 
. ·. . 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plain.tiffs should be, equitably estopped from denying they sc;,ld the property to 
Plaintiff and estopped from asserting their claim for Quiet Title to the property. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
More than five y®rS have elapse:d since Plaintiff sold ~e property to Defendant 
th~fore Plmntilf' s claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 
COUNTERCLAIM, 
For tause, otaction against the Plaintiffs, the:O~fendantBetilaroino Barraza 
CQDlpluiD$:,.and,~Jeg~ as folk>V1S1 · 
I. 
The :Plaintiffs, to the best of Defendant,s knowledg¢, are residents ofthe State of 
Arizona. 
n. 
The Defendant. Bernardino Barraza, is rrow and has been during ail of the times 
mentioned hereiii"a resident of Canyon County, Iclaho. 
Ill. 
The subJect of this litigation is real property located in Canyon County, Idaho, 
known as,29451 Pearl Road, Parma, and whichis more a:tromately described in Exhibit A 
ANSWER.AND COUNTERCLAIM-3 
000200 
. . . .... 
of the Plaintiffs' Complaint to Quiet Title. Exhibit Ais incorporated herein by this 
reference as if set forth in its entirety. Defendant claims an interest m said property, and 
jurisdiction is appropriate under Idaho Code§ 5-514. 
RB.BACH OF WB'.IJ'IEN CONJM,CT 
IV. 
Plaintiff' ~ecuted a written contract on Match 6, 2001, wherein Plaintiff' sold the 
V. 
Defendant Bernardino Barraza paid a total eftwenty-1:Wo thoU$$lf.l;six hundred 
thirty-five dollars and seventy-six cents' ($22,63'5. 76) as a down paymenton the subject 
property. 
VI. 
Plaintiffs now claim the subject propett;y was not sold to Oefettdant 
VIL 
Plaintiffs ,mive now flled a Quiet Title a:etfon·, and therefore have breached the 
written contract wherein they sold. the subject property to; Defendant. 
BR,BAG,ROF ORAL CQNIMC! 
vm. 
Plainuffs}iromised ro reimburse Deiendanttwenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00) . 
IX. 
Defendant vacated the subject property. 
ANSWER ANDCOUN1BR.CLAIM • 4 
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X. 
Plaintiffs~ .as of tllis date,. have failed to: reimburse Defendant the twenty thousand 
dollars ($20,000.00) as promised. 
XI. 
Plaihtiffs have now tiled this Quiet Tif:le action to avoid paying Defendant twenty 
thousand dollars ($20,000;00). as promised, and therefore have bteached tho oral contract of 
the parties. 
BltRACtl OF JMPLJ'.IID.It-l"FACT CONTRACT 
xn. 
D~ndant incorpol'Q.tes paragraphs I - XII of Defendant~s Counterolaitn into this 
cause ef action as if set forth in their entirety 
xm. 
Defendants have now breach~ the implled:.in-fact contra.cf by nling a quiet title 
action to avoid paying Defendant bis $20,000.00. 
UNJUST BNmCHMENT 
xv. 
Defendant incorporates pan1graphs I - XIV of Defendants Counterclaim into this 
. . 
cause of action as if set forth in their entirety. 
•· 
000202 
•. I 
XVI. 
Plaintiffs have filed a Quiet Title action in an attempt to negate Defendant's interest 
in the property and avoid paying Derenda,nt twenty thousand dollars; ($20,.000. 00) as 
:promised, all of which would result in an unjust enritnrnent to Plaintiffs. 
BQUITABLEESTOPPL:§ 
XVII 
Pltlllltiff:t~n1ed to Defendant be would rchnburse Defendant twenty thousand 
d~ ($20;000.00) if Defendant would vacate the proplffl}'. 
xvm 
Plaintiff intended Defendant to act upon his representation and vaetite the prope.t1y. 
XIX 
Plaintiff has now filed a Quiet Title action. to avoid pa~ Defendant the twenty 
thousand. dollars. ($201000.QO) as represented;. 
xx 
Defendant was unaware that Plaintiff wQUid refuse to :reimburse him as Plaintiff 
~p~~. 
~ 
D~nt :relied upc,n Plaintifrs ,repmsent4tian to him. 
XXII 
Defendant acteti" upon Plaintiff's representation .and vaca.ted the property. 
ANSWER AND·coWPBRCI..AIM -6 
000203 
. .. . 
QUIETmLE 
xxm 
The defendant incotporates into this cause of action paragraphs r~ XXII of 
Defendant's 'Cotlliwrtlaim as if set forth in·fuIL 
xxrv 
Defendant claims a cause of action against Plaintiffs a:nd complains of Plamliffs 
named in this ootion and all other persons unknown clau:ning $1Y right, title, esta~~ lien ()t 
intwest lo the r-1. pn1perty described adverse to plaintiff's title, and for a cause of action 
alleges the following. 
XXV 
Tixrtnie names or capacities. whether individua!, ~rate, associate, or otherwise, 
of Cross Clahnants -named in this-action as Does I through X are unknown to Defendan¼ 
who $Ues such Cross Claim~ts by such fietitious ll3Dles,.and .Defendtmt wiU amend this 
The defendant is the owner of'real property l00$ted in Canyon County, Idaho, 
known as,29452 PearlR.oad, P~ and whfoh is more accurately described in Exhibit A 
of the Plainti:.ffa' Complaint to Quiet Title. Exhibit A iJ inoorpo01,ted herein by this 
reference as if set forth in its entirety. 
Plaintiffs claim. an interest and estate in such property adverse to' Defendant; 
Plaintiffs' claim is witho~ anydght, and Plaintiffs have no right, estate, title, lien or 
interest in or to the property,. or any part ofit: 
ANSWER.AND CotlNtBRCtAIM - 7 
000204 
• ( I 
XXVIII 
Cross Claimants Does I through Doe X, may claim some estate, right, title, lien or 
interest in or to the property adverse to Plaintiff" s title, and such claµn or clainis constitute 
a cloud on Defendant's title to ~e property. 
D¢fendant has retuned the law finn of Hall, Frie<Jly & Ward of Mountain Homet 
Idaho, to prosecute this aetion on Defendant~s behalf and has agreed to pay said attorneys a 
reas.onable fee for their services. The sum of$] 50.00 per hour is a reasonable sum to be 
paid for such attorney's fees. 
XXX 
Defendant is entitled 10 recover his attorney fees incurred in th() prosecution of this 
counterclaim against the defendantpursuantto Idaho Code§:§ 6-324, 12-120, 12-121, and 
Rule 54(l}) of the 1dal1o Rules of C~vil Procedure. 
XXXI 
WI-mltBFOREt the Defendant prays forJudgtttent as follows; 
l. 'that.Plain:tilis Complaint to Quiet Title be dismi$ed;: 
2. That Plaintiffs be estopped from claunfug the property was not sold to 
Defendant, or in the altemative, be ordered to reimburse Defendfmt twenty thousand 
dollars ($20;0.00.00); ., 
. 
3. 'fiiat,lhe l>laintiffs be ordered to specifically perfonn the written contract 
and/or oral contract; 
4. Plaintiffs, and all persons claiming under them, be required to set forth the 
nature. of their claims to the described real property; 
000205 
... 
• •• i 
Court· . . f 
5. 
,·~, ,,,,,.,..,, 
. ·, 
. \.,_./ 
All adverse .claims to such teal pmperty be detel'lllinei by a decree of this 
6. The decree adjudge thatDfl'fendant.owns in fee ,simple, and is entitled to the 
qul:e.t and peaceful possession of, such real property, and tluit Ptw.ntiffs., and all persens .. - ' -· 
ehuming under them, have 110 estate, right, title. Hen~ or intmst in or to the real property or 
a.tlV art of . t• ._,,.. p. . i.., 
7. · The decree pem;ianently enjoin ea.oh Plaintiff', and .al1 persons clEdming 
urider them, from asserting any adverse claim tQ Defendant's property; 
8. For costs and disbursements, incluclingreasonable attorney fees in the 
amount .ofS-150;00 per hour; and 
9; That th~· court grant such other an4 further relief to ·the D~chUtt .. as it shall 
deem proper. 
llATEI):thm ·9.-1 dayofMay, 20Q1. 
AliJSWER AND CC>tJN'r'ERCLAIM -9 
000206 
, 
' ' 
STATE OP IDAHO, ) 
)ss; 
COUNTY OF ELMORE, ) 
Bemardin0 Batraza; being first duly swoI11; d.eposes ,~d :SaY'.S that. he'·is one. of the 
Defendants named iit th~ foregoing Answer Ellld Cotmtetclaiin, that he has read. said 
Answer and. Coun:t~cllUlll~ lcnows the contents thereof:and believes the facts therein statecl 
to be. true; 
~Un~~~: nt$k~ 
. D~ftndiint .... ·. ~ 
SUBSCRJRED AND $~ORN to before me t,hi.Jif day of May., 2-007~ 
CBRTW:IG~~rtRYI'~ 
I l:lEREB.Y CElltlFY that .upon tbe~iy ·olMay, 2007, I ca~ to be served 
a true anclc«reef.~y,ofAnsw~ and C~un,te~l1).i_l,D by1b~~·im:UO@.to.d,\Jelow, 
addressed to: @~foll~wint: 
MARK D. PERISON, PA.. 
3149 S. 9TH STREET SUITE JOO . . . , . 
P.O. Box 6575 
BOISE, IO 83707·65?5 
(208) 33 l--120'() 
(2-08-) 343-5838 FAX 
_Lu,S.Mrul 
.. · · Band. Dd.ivered 
· . 6v~might Mail 
FAX . 
000207 
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EXHIBIT "F" 
000209 
QUITCLAIM DEED 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED: Thirty Five Thousmid dollars ($35,000.00) 
. JUAN M CUEVAS AND YRENE BAEZ . . 
Whose address is: 501' WEDGE MONT A VE PHOENIX, AZ 85035 
Hereinafter called the first party. do hefebY convey, release, remise and forever 
QUITCLAIM unto second party: WILFRIDO CUEVAS 
The following described premises to--wit: 
Parcelno.06n0Sw198800 
196N-5WSB 
TAX 2-B 1N SWSE. 
SEIi". ,A7TAC.HED 
Dated: 06/13/2007 
Juan M Cuevas 
~ 
C-
c:= z :::0 
r-., ! 0 ,, ·c:r 
::3 ~ ..... 
N 
c.n 
0 .. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The said first party has signed and sealed these presents the· 
day IU;ld year first above ~tten. . 
SfJlte ofli>AHO ) 
:ss 
On this 13th day of June, 2007 before me, Jesus Lobo, a Notary Public in and for the 
State ofidaho, personally appeare~ Juan M Cuevas and Yrene Baez known to me to be the 
persons whose names are subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that they 
executed the same. · 
WITNESS my hand and official seaL 
000210 
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DE 
A ~art of the Southwest 14 of the 5outhe~st li, Section 
19, .Township 6 North, Range 5 West~of the 0 oise Meridian, 
more p-lrticularly described to-wit: 
Commencing at the So~thwest corner of the Southwest ~-of 
the Soutl':.east ~. Section 19,township 6 North, kange 5 
.:est of the Boise Meridian, the Ini tia.l Point of this des-
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 34421 
JUAN MANUEL CUEVAS and YRENE ) 
BAEZ, individuals, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant, ) 
) 
and ) 
) 
LIOBALDO GARZA, an individual, and ) 
DOES I through X, unknown claimants to the) 
real property described in Exhibit "A", ) 
commonly known as 29452 Pear Road, ) 
Parma, Idaho, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
2008 Opinion No. 60 
Filed: June 24, 2008 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, 
Canyon County. Hon. Dennis E. Goff, District Judge. 
Order denying motion to set aside default judgment, reversed and ~ remanded. 
Robert W. Ward of Hall, Friedly & Ward, Mountain Home, for appellant. 
Mark D. Perison, Boise, for respondents. 
PERRY, Judge 
Bernardino Barraza appeals from the district court's order denying his motion to set aside 
a default judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the order, vacate the default 
judgment, and remand to the district court. 
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I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
In March 2001, Juan Manuel Cuevas and Yrene Baez (hereinafter referred to as 
"Cuevas") allegedly entered into an agreement with Bernardino Barraza and Liobaldo Garza 
regarding real property (hereinafter "the ranch") owned by Cuevas. On May 6, 2002, Barraza 
recorded a form legal document titled "Claim of Lien," which was signed by Garza and himself 
on April 1, 2002. As filled in, the lien asserted that Cuevas contracted Barraza and Garza to 
furnish "labor, service or materials consisting of unpaid refund in the amount $20,000.00 for the 
payments on real estate title on" the ranch. (Filled-in portions of form in italics). The lien also 
asserted that the $20,000 remained unpaid and the "lienor furnished the first of the items on the 
fifth day of January, 2002," and the "last of the items on the fifth day of January, 2002." The 
lien also stated that "lienor" had provided the "contractor" with notice of the lien on March 7, 
2002. 
On April 2, 2007, Cuevas filed a complaint seeking to quiet title to the ranch and seeking 
damages for slander of title. Barraza received service of the complaint on April 15, 2007. 1 
Barraza having filed no answer, Cuevas filed a motion for default judgment and supporting 
affidavits on May 9, 2007. On May 15, 2007, the district court entered an order of default 
judgment. 
On May 24, 2007, Barraza filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 60(b), with an affidavit of counsel for Barraza and a proposed answer to the complaint 
and counterclaim.2 The answer and counterclaim alleged that Cuevas executed a written 
contract to sell the ranch to Barraza on March 6, 2001, for $80,000, and Barraza paid 
$22,635.76, as a down payment. Barraza attached as an exhibit the purported contract, which 
consists of two pages, one of which is written in Spanish. Barraza further alleged that Cuevas 
later orally promised to reimburse Barraza $20,000 upon re-sale of the ranch to another party if 
Although counsel also averred in the affidavit that he filed the original affidavits of 
service on Garza and Barraza with the motion for default judgment, those documents are not 
included in the record before us. 
2 The record indicates that counsel for Barraza also represented Garza in this matter prior 
to when Cuevas filed the complaint. Garza was not a party to Barraza's answer, however, and is 
not a party to this appeal. 
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Barraza would vacate the premises. Barraza pled that he vacated the property and Cuevas had 
not reimbursed the $20,000. Barraza's answer also alleged affirmative defenses that Barraza was 
the owner of the ranch, Cuevas should be equitably estopped from denying he sold the ranch to 
Barraza, and the statute of limitation barred Cuevas' claims. The answer also included 
counterclaims of breach of a written contract, breach of an oral contract, breach of an implied in-
fact contract, unjust enrichment, equitable estoppel, and a claim to quiet title to the ranch in 
Barraza. In the affidavit, Barraza's counsel averred that Barraza had previously retained him as 
counsel with regard to the dispute over this land several months before the complaint was filed 
but did not contact him promptly when served with the complaint. According to counsel's 
affidavit, Barraza believed that he did not need to contact counsel due to counsel's prior 
representation. Counsel further averred that Barraza spoke very little English and thus could not 
understand the summons requiring a responsive pleading in twenty days. 
Cuevas filed a brief in opposition to the motion with a supporting affidavit and evidence 
of correspondence between his counsel and counsel for Barraza. The first letter, faxed from 
counsel for Cuevas to counsel for Barraza on March 19, 2007, requested that Barraza and Garza 
release the lien and indicated that, if they failed to do so, Cuevas would file a complaint to quiet 
title after March 23, 2007. The letter also included a copy of the complaint to be filed and 
indicated that, if counsel was still representing Barraza and Garza, he should contact them to 
make them aware of the impending litigation. In the second letter, faxed from counsel for 
Cuevas to counsel for Barraza on May 21, 2007, counsel indicated that he had received a phone 
message from Barraza's counsel stating that Barraza had "surfaced" and wished to defend 
against the action. Cuevas asserted in the brief that Barraza had not established excusable 
neglect with the affidavit of his counsel and that Barraza did not have a meritorious defense 
against the quiet title action. 
At a hearing, the district court ruled that Barraza had not established a mistake or 
excusable neglect because Rule 60(b) does not mention a language barrier or lack of knowledge 
of the legal system as bases to set aside a default judgment. The district court stated that a 
reasonable person who received a summons in a foreign language "would have contacted a 
lawyer if they were familiar with the lawyer to advise them." The district court also ruled that 
Barraza had not pled facts that would establish a meritorious defense to the quiet title action 
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because Barraza had not set forth facts that Barraza had a valid lien on the ranch. Regarding the 
effect of the lien, the district court stated: 
Even if I said there was a land sale agreement for this particular piece of 
property, which I would have to assume that's what the Spanish document says . 
and that's referring to this piece of property, the lien says we're not claiming any 
ownership of that property any longer. All we're claiming is that when he sold it 
he was going to give us $20,000. 
The district court reasoned that, although Barraza may have alleged facts that would establish a 
meritorious claim for $20,000 in monetary damages, the default judgment only affected the 
validity of the lien and did not preclude any future action for monetary damages. Because the 
statute of limitation had run with regard to any claims based on the lien, the district court 
concluded that Barraza did not have a meritorious defense against the quiet title action. The 
district court subsequently entered an order denying Barraza's motion to set aside the default 
judgment. Barraza appeals. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A default judgment may be set aside where it resulted from, inter alia, excusable neglect 
or mistake of fact. I.R.C.P. 60(b). A trial court's refusal to set aside a default judgment is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Idaho State Police, ex. rel. Russell v. Real 
Property Situated in County of Cassia, 144 Idaho 60, 62, 156 P.3d 561, 563 (2007). On review 
of the trial court's application of law to the facts found on a motion to set aside a default 
judgment upon the grounds set forth in Rule 60(b )(1 }, the reviewing court will consider whether 
appropriate criteria were applied and whether the result is one that logically follows. Tyler v. 
Keeney, 128 Idaho 524, 526, 915 P.2d 1382, 1384 (Ct. App. 1996). Thus, if: (a) the trial court 
makes findings of fact which are not clearly erroneous; (b) the court applies to those facts the 
proper criteria under Rule 60(b)(l) (tempered by the policy favoring relief in doubtful cases); 
and ( c) the trial court's decision follows logically from the application of such criteria to the facts 
found, then the trial court will be deemed to have acted within its sound discretion, and its 
decision will not be overturned on appeal. Id 
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m. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Mistake of Fact or Excusable Neglect 
Barraza asserts that the district court erred in ruling that he had not established that his 
failure to timely file an answer to the complaint was due to a mistake or excusable neglect. 
Cuevas asserts that Barraza did not present any admissible evidence establishing excusable 
neglect because Barraza relied entirely on the inadmissible hearsay statements contained in his 
counsel's affidavit. Cuevas also asserts that the inability to speak or read English is not a 
sufficient basis to establish mistake or excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(l). 
We first address Cuevas' assertion that Barraza presented no admissible evidence 
supporting his assertion of mistake or excusable neglect. Barraza presented only the 
inadmissible hearsay statements contained in an affidavit by Barraza's counsel as to Barraza's 
mistake. See I.RE. 801, 802. Cuevas, however, did not object to the admissibility of the 
affidavit at the hearing on the motion to set aside default. When ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment, a trial court may consider an affidavit containing statements that fail to comply with 
the admissibility requirements of I.R.C.P. 56(e) in the absence of a timely objection and motion 
to strike.3 See State, Dept. of Agric. v. Curry Bean Co. Inc., 139 Idaho 789, 792, 86 P.3d 503, 
506 (2004); Tolmie Farms, Inc. v. J.R. Simplot Co., Inc., 124 Idaho 607, 610, 862 P.2d 299, 302 
(1993); Camp v. Jiminez, 107 Idaho 878, 881, 693 P.2d 1080, 1083 (Ct. App. 1984). The same 
rule should apply to the failure to properly object to the admissibility of statements contained in 
an affidavit submitted to establish excusable neglect to set aside a default judgment. Although 
Cuevas asserted in the brief in opposition to the motion to set aside default that the affidavit was 
hearsay, he did not move to strike nor object to its consideration by the district court. Rather 
than object, counsel for Cuevas provided little argument in opposition to Barraza's theory of 
mistake or excusable neglect. Indeed, counsel stated "I think if the meritorious defense issue 
weren't here in front of us, I wouldn't be here. I would have stipulated to set aside the default 
because I understand how liberal that standard is in terms of mistake." 
3 Pursuant to Rule 56( e ), supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
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The district court expressly rejected Barraza's assertion that a language barrier could 
cause mistake or excusable neglect under Rule 60(b )(1) and, thus, considered the affidavit as 
evidence. Because the district court considered the affidavit as evidence at the hearing, we will 
also consider it in the absence of an adequate objection below. 
Barraza asserts that the affidavit provided a sufficient factual basis for a mistake or 
excusable neglect under Rule 60(b )( 1 ). The affidavit provided, in part: 
4. Defendant believed that I was representing him after our 
discussions regarding the case, and therefore had the mistaken belief that he did 
not need to let me know that a lawsuit had been filed and a lady had given him 
papers as service of process. 
5. Defendant speaks very little English, cannot read or write English, 
and thus did not understand the notice in the Summons requiring him to file a 
responsive pleading within twenty (20) days. 
The record indicates that Barraza received service of the summons and complaint on April 15, 
2007. Rule 12(a) required Barraza to file his responsive pleading within twenty days--by May 5, 
2007. The district court entered default judgment on May 15, 2007, and the record indicates that 
Barraza filed his motion to set aside default, with a responsive pleading attached, on May 24, 
2007. Thus, even if we assume that Barraza received service of the default judgment on the date 
it was entered, he filed his motion to set aside the default judgment within nine days. 
Barraza asserts that the affidavit demonstrated mistake or excusable neglect due to his 
communication barrier, his poor knowledge of the legal system, his mistaken belief that counsel 
was representing him in this matter at the time he received the summons, and his diligence in 
moving to set aside the default judgment. A mistake sufficient to warrant setting aside a default 
judgment must be of fact and not of law. Idaho State Police, 144 Idaho at 62, 156 P.3d at 563. 
Neglect must be excusable and, to be of that calibre, must be conduct that might be expected of a 
reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances. Id Reasonable diligence in the effort 
to set aside the default judgment is a requirement in demonstrating reasonably prudent conduct. 
See Baldwin v. Baldwin, 114 Idaho 525, 528, 757 P.2d 1244, 1247 (Ct. App. 1988); Clark v. 
Atwood, 112 Idaho 115, 117, 730 P .2d 1035, 1037 (Ct. App. 1986). 
In several cases with lengthier delays than that caused by Barraza, Idaho appellate courts 
have held that relief should be granted from default judgment. See, e.g., Johnson v. Oxborrow, 
141 Idaho 635, 639, 115 P.3d 726, 730 (2005); Kovachy v. DeLeusomme, 122 Idaho 973, 975, 
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842 P.2d 309, 311 (Ct. App. 1992); Baldwin, 114 Idaho at 527, 757 P.2d at 1246; Johnson v. 
Pioneer Title Co. of Ada County, 104 Idaho 727,733,662 P.2d 1171, 1177 (Ct. App. 1983). 
These cases demonstrate that in doubtful cases a standard of liberality rather than strictness must 
be applied. See Idaho State Police, 144 Idaho at 62, 156 P.3d at 563. The district court erred in 
not applying the standard of liberality to this case. 
The district court also erred to the extent that it ruled a language barrier cannot be 
considered in evaluating mistake or excusable neglect. See Straub v. Straub, 80 Idaho 221,225, 
327 P.2d 358, 360 (1958). In Straub, the Supreme Court considered a party's inability to speak 
the English language as a factor in support of its holding that the district court erred in denying a 
motion to set aside a default judgment. 4 Id. 
Furthermore, the district court does not appear to have considered Barraza's factual 
assertion that he believed that counsel was representing him in this matter at the time he received 
the summons, and diligence in moving to set aside the default judgment. Cuevas's attorney 
asserts that he mailed a copy of the complaint to counsel for Barraza prior to filing the complaint, 
but this assertion fails to establish that counsel for Barraza knew the date the complaint would be 
filed or that Barraza wished to employ counsel's services in contesting the complaint. The 
affidavit of counsel for Barraza indicates that Barraza had the mistaken belief that counsel was 
representing him based upon counsel's prior representation of him in this matter. Although the 
district court was correct that a mistake of law or a mistake regarding the legal system is not 
grounds for relief from default judgment, Barraza has established that he made a factual mistake 
regarding his relationship with his attorney. 
The affidavit considered by the district court indicates that Barraza' s delay was due to his 
misunderstanding of the English language and his mistaken belief that counsel was representing 
him. Barraza diligently moved to set aside the default judgment nine days after it was entered. 
Based on the record before us, we cannot say that Barraza was guilty of indifference or 
deliberate delay in failing to timely answer the complaint. The district court abused its discretion 
4 Straub applied the default judgment standard contained in the repealed LC. § 5-905. 
Similar to Rule 60(b)(l), that former section also allowed a trial court to set aside a default 
judgment for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. See 1921 Idaho Sess. Laws, 
ch. 235. The Idaho Supreme Court has also recently relied on its opinions interpreting the 
former LC. § 5-905, for guidance in applying Rule 60(b)(l). See Johnson, 141 Idaho at 639, 115 
P.3d at 730. 
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by applying the incorrect legal standards and failing to adequately consider Barraza's factual 
assertions. Applying the proper standards, the district court should have concluded that Barraza 
demonstrated mistake or excusable neglect. 
B. Meritorious Defense 
When moving to set aside a default judgment, the moving party must not only meet the 
requirements of LR. C.P. 60(b) but must also plead facts which, if established, would constitute a 
defense to the action. Idaho State Police, 144 Idaho at 62, 156 P.3d at 563. It would be an idle 
exercise for the court to set aside a default if there is in fact no real justiciable controversy. Id. 
The defense matters must be detailed. Once a default has been entered the pleading of a 
defensive matter must go beyond the mere notice requirements that would be sufficient if pied 
before default. Id. at 63, 156 P.3d at 564. Factual details must be pied with particularity. Id 
Barraza asserts that the district court erred in ruling that he failed to plead facts which, if 
proven to be true, would entitle him to an interest in the ranch. The district court found that "the 
lien says we're not claiming any ownership of that property any longer." The district court thus 
ruled that Barraza's claims regarding the prior written agreement did not establish a meritorious 
defense. The lien referred to in the district court's ruling was attached to Cuevas' complaint and 
appears to have been a form document for a mechanics lien. 5 Barraza apparently attempted to 
fill out the document such that it asserted a claim against the property for "the unpaid refund in 
the amount of $20,000 for the payments on real estate title." Cuevas' complaint alleged that, if 
the lien was a mechanics lien, the statute of limitation to file a foreclosure action on the lien had 
passed pursuant to LC. § 45-510. The complaint further alleged that, if the lien was based upon a 
breach of contract action, the time to file such an action, pursuant to I.C. §§ 5-216, 5-217, had 
expired by the passage of five years since the time when Barraza was aware of such a claim. The 
complaint sought to have the lien released from the property, to have title quieted against all 
other claimants, and to have damages awarded for slander of title. The default judgment quieted 
title in Cuevas as against the claim asserted in the lien and stated that Barraza and Garza "shall 
have no further right, title or interest in and to the real property." 
5 A mechanics lien is a "statutory lien that secures payment for labor or materials supplied 
in improving, repairing, or maintaining real or personal property." BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY, 943 (8th ed. 2004). See also I.C. §§ 45-501 to 45-525. 
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To establish a meritorious defense, Barraza had to allege at least one claim demonstrating 
that he had an interest in the ranch such that title should not be quieted in Cuevas. In the 
responsive pleading, Barraza did not claim any interest under the lien nor even refer to it; rather, 
he alleged that Cuevas entered into a written contract to sell the ranch to Barraza for $80,000 on 
March 6, 2001, and that Barraza paid $22,635.76, as a down payment. Barraza claimed that 
Cuevas breached the written contract for sale of the ranch by filing the instant quiet title action. 
Pursuant to LC. § 5-216, an action upon any contract, obligation or liability founded upon an 
instrument in writing must be filed within five years. A cause of action for breach of contract 
accrues upon breach for limitations purposes. See Simons v. Simons, 134 Idaho 824, 830, 11 
P.3d 20, 26 (2000); Skaggs v. Jensen, 94 Idaho 179,180,484 P.2d 728, 729 (1971). The five-
year statute of limitation for Barraza to bring this breach of contract claim began to run when 
Barraza became aware of the breach. The breach alleged in Barraza' s answer occurred when 
Cuevas filed the instant quiet title action--April 2, 2007. Barraza filed his answer asserting the 
breach of contract claim less than two months later. If an enforceable contract can be proven, 
this claim would constitute a meritorious defense to the quiet title action because it would 
establish that Barraza has an ownership right in the ranch. If Barraza can prove his allegations 
that he contracted to buy the ranch, he would be entitled to specific performance on the contract. 
See P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 238, 159 P.3d 870, 
875 (2007). 
The district court's finding that the lien disclaimed any right Barraza had in the property 
was clearly erroneous. Nothing in the language of the lien disclaimed any right to the property 
that may have existed at the time Barraza recorded the lien. By filing the lien, Barraza appears to 
have attempted to give notice of his interest in the property in the event that Cuevas failed to 
return Barraza's down payment upon sale of the land to a third party. Barraza did not assert 
below and does not assert now that the lien was ever enforceable. The expiration of the 
limitation period to bring an action attempting to enforce the lien under the mechanic's lien 
statutes, I.C. §§ 45-501 to 45-525, did not extinguish any property right created by a written 
contract for the sale of the ranch. Cuevas asserts that Barraza's actions of vacating the ranch and 
filing the lien establish that he knew Cuevas did not intend to sell Barraza the property and, 
therefore, the breach of contract claim accrued when he signed the lien--April 1, 2002. If 
Barraza's allegations are true, however, Barraza purchased the ranch pursuant to a written 
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contract and only filed the lien in order to protect his right to the money he had paid while he 
believed Cuevas was attempting to sell the ranch to a third party. Under that factual scenario, the 
breach did not occur until Cuevas filed the instant quiet title action. 
Cuevas also argues that the documents attached to Barraza's answer, which purportedly 
constitute a contract for sale of the ranch to Barraza, demonstrate that the alleged contract does 
not satisfy the statute of frauds, LC.§ 9-505(4). However, Barraza alleged facts which could be 
sufficient to take the contract out of the statute of frauds by application of the doctrine of part 
performance or equitable estoppel. See Chappin v. Linden, 144 Idaho 393, 396-97, 162 P.3d 
772, 775-76 (2007); Frantz v. Parke, 111 Idaho 1005, 1008-11, 729 P.2d 1068, 1071-74 (Ct. 
App. 1986). 
Furthermore, Cuevas is incorrect that Barraza was required to prove the terms of the 
written contract. To establish a meritorious defense, a party moving to set aside a default 
judgment is not required to present evidence in order to have the default judgment set aside. 
Idaho State Police, 144 Idaho at 63, 156 P.3d at 564. The meritorious defense requirement is a 
pleading requirement, not a burden of proof. Id. Barraza was not required to submit the written 
contract into evidence or provide a translation of the portion of the contract written in Spanish. 
Barraza was required to plead a meritorious defense with particularity. See id. Barraza pied that 
there was a written contract for the sale of the land and indicated the date of the contract, the 
parties, the real property involved, and the amounts of the down payment and full sale price. 
Barraza asserted that Cuevas breached the contract by filing the instant quiet title action. 
Assuming these facts to be true, Barraza has established a meritorious defense because Cuevas 
breached the contract. 
Although Barraza does not assert that the lien was valid or enforceable, he pled a 
meritorious breach of written contract claim sufficient to warrant setting aside the default 
judgment. We need not address the other allegations contained in Barraza's responsive pleading 
because we have concluded that Barraza asserted one meritorious defense to the quiet title 
action. After the default is set aside, Barraza's additional affirmative defenses and counterclaims 
will more properly be addressed by the district court in the first instance. 
C. Attorney Fees 
Both parties request attorney fees on appeal pursuant to LC. §§ 12-120, 12-121, and 
I.AR. 41. Both parties, however, failed to provide argument in support of their requests for 
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attorney fees. A party must provide argument in support of a request for attorney fees on appeal. 
See Weaver v. Searle Bros., 131 Idaho 610, 616, 962 P.2d 381, 387 (1998). See also I.A.R. 
35(a)(6). We therefore decline to address both requests for attorney fees. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court abused its discretion in ruling that Barraza failed to demonstrate 
mistake or excusable neglect. The district court also abused its discretion in ruling that Barraza 
had not pied a meritorious defense to Cuevas' quiet title action. We therefore reverse the district 
court's order denying the motion to set aside, vacate the default judgment, and remand to the 
district court for further proceedings. Costs, but not attorney fees, are awarded to Barraza. 
Chief Judge GUTIERREZ, CONCURS. 
Judge LANSING, DISSENTING 
Although I agree with the majority that Barraza has adequately alleged a meritorious 
defense, I would affirm the district court's holding that he failed to show that his default was the 
product of excusable neglect. 
A motion to set aside a default judgment under this rule is committed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court, and we therefore will not disturb the trial court's order in the absence 
of an abuse of discretion. Clear Springs Trout Co. v. Anthony, 123 Idaho 141, 143, 845 P.2d 
559, 561 (1992); Tyler v. Keeney, 128 Idaho 524, 526, 915 P.2d 1382, 1384 (Ct. App. 1996). 
Excusable neglect is "a factual question ... which 'must be answered by examining what might 
be expected of a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances."' State, Dep 't of Law 
Enforcement v. One 1990 Geo Metro, 126 Idaho 675, 680, 889 P.2d 109, 114 (Ct. App. 1995) 
(quoting Herzinger v. Lockwood Corp., 109 Idaho 18, 19, 704 P.2d 350, 351 (Ct. App. 1985)). 
Thus, on appeal we examine the district court's determination as to whether the litigant "engaged 
in conduct which, although constituting neglect, was nevertheless excusable because a 
reasonably prudent person might have done the same thing under the circumstances." 
&hraufnagel v. Quinowski, 113 Idaho 753, 754, 747 P.2d 775, 776 (Ct. App. 1987). 
Here, the only evidence purporting to explain Barraza' s inaction after service of the 
complaint was presented through the affidavit of his attorney, which states: 
2. That Defendant discussed this case with me, and paid me for my legal 
advice; however, at that time, no lawsuit was filed and therefore I could not file a 
Notice of Appearance on behalf of Defendant. 
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3. A Complaint was later filed and Defendant was served with the 
Complaint, but did not tell me, thus, no Answer and Counterclaim was filed. 
4. Defendant believed that I was representing him after our discussions 
regarding the case, and therefore had the mistaken belief that he did not need to 
let me know that a lawsuit had been filed and a lady had given him papers as 
service of process. 
5. Defendant speaks very little English, cannot read or write English, and 
thus did not understand the notice in the Summons requiring him to file a 
responsive pleading within twenty (20) days. 
From this affidavit we are informed that at some unidentified time prior to 
commencement of the action, Barraza talked to his lawyer about the dispute but did not contact 
the lawyer after Barraza was served with process. We are told he believed that he did not need to 
notify the lawyer about service of the complaint, but we are given no basis upon which he could 
have formed such a mistaken belief. We are also informed that because of a language barrier, he 
did not understand the notification in the summons requiring a responsive pleading within twenty 
days, and from that we can infer that he did not ask anyone to translate the document for him. 
In my view, the district court was well within the bounds of its discretion in finding that 
these facts do not describe conduct "which would be expected of a reasonably prudent person 
under the same circumstances." I am not unsympathetic with the difficulties confronted by a 
non-English-speaking person who is thrust into the complexities of the American legal system, 
but a language barrier, standing alone, cannot justify ignoring service of process. Reasonable 
diligence in that circumstance would require that an individual at least obtain the services of an 
interpreter who could explain the content of the document. Although Barraza might have had a 
legitimate reason to expect that his attorney would protect his interests without notification from 
Barraza when process was served, the evidence presented in support of the motion to set aside 
the default judgment discloses no reason, much less a reasonable one, for such a belief. A recent 
decision of the Idaho Supreme Court indicates that if a defendant who was served with a 
complaint retains a lawyer to represent him in the action and the lawyer fails to do so, excusable 
neglect is shown, Idaho State Police ex rel. Russell v. Real Property Situated in the County of 
Cassia, 144 Idaho 60, 156 P.3d 561 (2007). 1 That is not what occurred here, however, for the 
evidence indicates Barraza did not ask the attorney to do anything after the complaint was filed. 
This Idaho Supreme Court decision appears to implicitly overrule an Idaho Court of 
Appeals decision, Rosales v. Balbas, 125 Idaho 848, 851, 875 P.2d 945, 948 (Ct. App. 1994), 
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For these reasons, I would affirm the district court's denial of Barraza's motion to set 
aside the default judgment. 
where we stated that ''the neglect of an attorney is attributed to the client; unless the attorney's 
neglect is legally excusable, the client will not be excused." 
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JAN 15 2009 
D 
P.M. 
Mark D. Perison, Bar No. 4804 
MARK D. PERISON, P.A. 
314 S. 9th Street, Suite 300 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
KL- DEPUTY 
P. 0. Box 6575 
Boise, Idaho 83707-6575 
Telephone: (208) 331-1200 
Fax: (208) 343-5838 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
JUAN MANUEL CUEVAS and ) 
YRENE BAEZ, individuals ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
) 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an ) 
individual, LIOBALDO GARZA, ) 
an individual, and DOES I ) 
through X, unknown claimants to ) 
the real property described in ) 
Exhibit "A" hereto, commonly ) 
known as 29452 Pearl Road, ) 
Parma, Idaho, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
Case No. CV07-3536 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
TO WITHDRAW AS ATTORNEY 
OF RECORD 
Based upon the Request of attorney Mark D. Perison, and the firm of 
Mark D. Perison, P.A., to withdraw as attorneys of record for Plaintiffs Juan 
Cuevas and Yrene Baez, and for good cause shown, 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS ATTORNEY OF RECORD - Page I 
000227 
IT IS THE ORDER OF THE COURT, that: 
1. Mark D. Perlson and Mark D. Perison, P.A., attorneys of record 
for Plaintiffs Juan Cuevas and Yrene Baez, are entitled to withdraw as 
Plaintiffs' attorneys, subject to each of the following conditions/requirements: 
2. Plaintiffs shall appoint another attorney to represent them in this 
matter or they shall appear in person, and they shall make this election within 
twenty (20) days of the date upon which withdrawing attorney has filed proof 
of service of this Order upon Plaintiffs Juan Cuevas and Yrene Baez; and, 
3. Withdrawing attorney shall serve a copy of this Order upon the 
Plaintiffs and serve a copy of this Order upon Plaintiffs Juan Cuevas and Yrene 
Baez by certified mail, return receipt requested; and, 
4. Withdrawing attorney shall continue to represent Plaintiffs Juan 
Cuevas and Yrene Baez until proof of service of this Order has been made 
upon Plaintiffs Juan Cuevas and Yrene Baez; and, 
5. Upon the entry of this Order and the filing of proof of service of 
this Order upon Plaintiffs Juan Cuevas and Yrene Baez, no further proceedings 
can be had in the action which will affect Plaintiffs Juan Cuevas and Yrene 
Baez for a period of twenty (20) days; and if the Plaintiffs Juan Cuevas and 
Yrene Baez fail to provide Notice of their intent to appear with substitute 
counsel or in person within such twenty (20) day period, such failure will be 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS ATTORNEY OF RECORD- Page 2 
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. ' 
' 
sufficient grounds for the entry of a default against Plaintiffs Juan Cuevas and 
Yrene Baez without further notice. 
DATED this __J.5:._ day of January, 2009. 
THOMAS J RYAN 
Thomas J. Ryan 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ...is=... day of January 9, 2009, I caused 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served by the method indicated 
below and addressed to each of the following: 
Mark D. Perison [ ] U.S. Mail 
Mark D. Perlson, P.A. [ v'] Hand Delivered 
P.O. Box 6575 [ ] Overnight Mail 
Boise, ID 83707 [ ] Facsimile 
Robert Ward [ v'] U.S. Mail 
Hall, Friedly & Ward [ ] Hand Delivered 
340 East 2nd North [ ] Overnight Mail 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 [ ] Facsimile 
Juan Cuevas [ v'] U.S. Mail 
Yrene Baez [ ] Hand Delivered 
5019 W. Edgemont Ave. [ ] Overnight Mail 
Phoenix, AZ 85035 [ ] Facsimile 
WILLIAM H HURST 
KCANNON 
Clerk 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS ATTORNEY OF RECORD - Page 3 
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EXHIBIT "I" 
000230 
ROBERT WARD RECORDED. 
HALL. FRIEDLY & WARD . . F I L E D 
Att-0rneya for ~ferukmt B4rrtardino fS'l'fflH -2 ~ Rm l O 11_---A.M, \ of~ P~M. 340 East2ridNotth ~ n 
M()W!fllin Romo, Idaho i:3647 MAR r 7 2009 
Telep~ne: (208) 511-4412 
F~: {:l0~.537~-tU44 RY . 
Idaho Stato BarNumber 4442 
\aU!Wtt-~S-"7...,.--~-
JN IBE DISTIUCT COURT OF THE tHJltD .JUl)IQLM, DISTRICT OF mE 
STATE OF JDAHOt IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAN:YON 
JUAN MANUSL CUBVM and YRENE 
SABZ, individuals, 
vs. 
I _, 
I 
I 
I 
_i 
-1 
I 
I 
l 
I 
I 
Case No. CV-07-3536 
JtJDMBNT AND DHCREB 
QonmN01lll,E 
The above-entitled ~use came on regularly before the Court in CaldwellJ.County 
ofCmiyo~ State of!d~ on the ) \a day of "1[v\~ 2009. The Plaintiff's, Juan 
Manuel Cuevas.and Ytene Baez, having been duly and regularly served with the Order 
Granting Motion te Withdraw as Attorney of Record. The Plaintiffs. Juan Manuel 
Cuevas and Yren:e ~aez, having failed to file and serve an additional written: appearance 
within twenty (20) days of servfoe of the Otd(U' Granting-Motion to Withdraw as Attorney 
of Record, either in petSOD. by attorney or otherwise, pursuant.to the Ortier Granting 
Met.ion to Withdntw as Attorney of Record. 
00023:1 
~ , 
,'. \ ' 
the Court bas reviewed the record and· file in thiS: ac~n and the Answer and 
Counterclaim-of Defendant,.Bern:ardino B~-~ -o:wne:sbip and possession ·of 
A. -..i.l . d· "·bed· _.L_ • • th . A ... -....... . . . d. c· ... -f_f._;,.._, L-..,J-.,..,,...1....:...... ,.....1~.ul~ wC LQU property· --~ . · Wvn:;lD.; · e /UJ.lj_wer. att · · oun~.~~JM.W. Wh~ -~ V-wlll~ 
qd the Co.urt being satis~ed that the relief asked for should b~ gritlted. 
NOW, 'IHElUWO~ Upon application of counsel ofthe Defendant, and upon 
the MJidavit of Defendant tbatnone of the Plaintiffs: ·are infants or ineompctent persons, 
IT Is. ~ :rn;~unn·u TTl':ln-1'B·Y o··. ~riuuuo•·. AO· . . run· .· h-~o·· AND' - . n·E:· c· nnt.o·· ., ·. J.CW~V~-~~ ' .. · I~~- .. , :i . · · .· ..... : U.-"' : ., .... ' ·.·. : ~p . • 
quiet and p~ po~sessi(m of the parcel ofland · eonurtonly known as 29452 Pearl 
R-0~ Parma, ldah~ situated in tlre Co.un.ty ofCanyon, State ofldaho, and described in 
~ -~,_;;: L.·l., .: ~_• A._<.-!J Aftco~l!ed····.h· ·=,.. ___ .;;...,.j· b··y:···,_+&-P..-..,,._.,,. ·) .. ,._,,.. ·nv,,-__ · •-.,1 -·'k,_re:...-. 
~~"' _n . ~· e.Llil!I.V l:WU .......... ~ ... """"' UJ,~ .. f'-".'~ ~"' . ..... 
{.. . . .. . . . . . 
again~ iJilefa:iq;<>t denumds ofthe Plamtiffs,,Juan.MM.uel Cuevas and Yi:ene B~ in all 
orlllif part of ~drcal 'J:>'I:OJ)erty, 
DATEDthis_'\\o_. dayof_\""-_· __ -_~_-_ .· __ _____,2008. 
D~J\J.d· .. -·_ .. . . g~ 
· i; CERTIFICATE OF SER.VICE 
I~Y .CMTIFY that 011 the l '7 ~ pf~_· ......... ...,.;..~--___ _.., .. 2069, a 
true am ~®-Pf of the within .and furego4ts ~em W8$ served upc.:m.: 
RobertWatd 
Baa Fl'bMfly. & Ward 
340 a 1114 North 
Mo~~me, ID 83647 
Juan. M.·~.·. ~l Cuevas . 4\ ~. .. ·~. . . 
Yl'CD.C Baez · · 
SOlP W.-~ Bdg~t Avenue 
P~AZ 85035 
,I 
. t 
L 
''. ' 
)r(] U.S. Mail. 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overni&ht Mail 
[ ] Faesimi1~ 
{1 U.S.Mail 
[ ] Hand Deliv,md 
[ ] OVernight Mail 
[ J Facsimile 
JC1DOMBNr AND Q.BCJm'EQUIETINO TnLE • 3 O OO 2 33 
-------------------------~----,-----·-,,-·~ 
•....,, .. t •. ·,,;. ~ ..• - '• ... ' 
• 
--~ ·· ... 
A par( of the Southwest Quarter of tb S011thtJtcst Qutter, ~~.n 19, Towns.Mp 6 
N~ Range S West, Boise Meridiiu, €iny4n Couflty, ~ho., more ~riy 
dcscrlied to;.wft: 
. . 
Commtoclrag·.at·(bc,, So~thwest corner of theSo-tttllwest Quader ottbeSouth~t 
~. Soction 19, 1'ownJhJp6 Nortb, Range 5 West, Bo.lM Meridian; lhe 
Jli(h'~ POlNT 4ftb4 descrtpti<in; tbcace · 
N(irilt 0'°7' Kast :9l.4 .,_., afong the Wert lka~ 1ft ~e •idd 80,uthWU:t Qbaritr of th-e · 
.SQ~ Q'Dal'fc.tf tbllDCe 
South.55°15' ltastJ:l6.$ feet then~e 
,$'Guth tr07• \Wit 13.0·~ P-'*Ueltq ffluakl We.st fine, to• poµit oath South IIDl' 
o(:tlie: ..ad,Soiltbwt;St Qual1el- or1he.Sntheast Quarter; tll·ctt~· 
Sooth 8¥35' Wes~7.U fcet,.along da.oa:ttt $~11th Im•_to Ulf·•ffimAL POINT OF 
'*"ttm."ft'ili~,..,,.fllm.· . ·o·· 'N ..... ~·.v ~.1 ..• 
EXHIBIT A 
000234 
Rebecca A. Rainey, ISB No. 7525 
MOFFATT, THOMAS,BARRETT,ROCK& 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
rar@moffatt.com 
24163.0000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Fl~ 
OCT 2 7 2009 
CANYON COUNTY CLEAi< 
T EARLS, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
and spouse (if any); LIOBALDO GARZA, an 
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I 
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS 
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN 
EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY Ki~OWN AS 
29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV09-8175 
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT BARRAZA'S 
OBJECTION AND MOTION TO 
STRIKE 
COMES NOW Wilfrido Cuevas, by and through undersigned counsel of record, 
and hereby files this opposition to defendant Bernardino Barraza's objection and motion to strike 
the affidavit ofWilfrido Cuevas filed in support of motion for summary judgment. 
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT BARRAZA'S 
OBJECTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE - 1 
000235 
Client:1411389.1 
Defendant Bernardino Barraza's objection to and motion to strike the affidavit of 
Wilfrido Cuevas is based on a misinterpretation of the statute of frauds as it relates to transfers of 
interests in land. Idaho Code Section 9-503 provides only that a writing is required for the 
transfer of an estate or interest in real property. In this matter, such writing exists as the 
quitclaim deed recorded as instrument number 2007043067 recorded in Canyon County on 
June 20, 2007, transferred Juan Cuevas' interest in the property to Wilfrido Cuevas. The 
evidence that defendant seeks to strike pursuant to his objection and motion to strike is evidence 
of the underlying oral contract pursuant to which the property was ultimately transferred. The 
statute of frauds does not speak to and does not require the exclusion of evidence of the 
circumstances underlying the transfer of property that is evidenced in writing. Because Wilfrido 
Cuevas' interest in the property is evidenced by a written, duly recorded quitclaim deed, the 
statute of frauds has no application in this matter and does not operate to exclude any of Wilfrido 
Cuevas' testimony regarding the underlying transaction. Accordingly, defendant's objection to 
the affidavit should be overruled and defendant's motion to strike should be denied. 
DATED this 27th day of October, 2009. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
By~~~ 
Rebecca A. Rainey - OfeF 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT BARRAZA'S 
OBJECTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE - 2 
000236 
Client:1411389.1 
. . 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th day of October, 2009, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT BARRAZA'S 
OBJECTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE to be served by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Robert Ward 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
340 East 2nd North 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Facsimile (208) 587-3144 
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
()() Facsimile 
12----C pf (,b' 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT BARRAZA'S 
OBJECTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE - 3 
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Rebecca A. Rainey, ISB No. 7525 
MOFFA TI, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
rar@moffatt.com 
24163.0000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
F I J p Q.M. 
OCT 2 7 2009 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T EARLS, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD ruDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
and spouse (if any); LIO BALDO GARZA, an 
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I 
THROUGH X, UNKi."-rOWN CLAIMANTS 
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN 
EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN AS 
29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV09-8175 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW Wilfiido Cuevas ("W. Cuevas"), by and through undersigned 
counsel of record, and hereby files this reply memorandum in support of the pending motion for 
summary judgment: 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
000238 
Client: 1409434. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As it currently stands, the default judgment quieting title to the ranch located at 
29453 Pearl Road, Parma, Idaho (the "Property"), in Bernardino Barraza's ("Barraza") name is 
the result of procedural defects and irregularities that made Barraza the winner of the litigation 
lottery. Looking at the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Barraza claims 
to have paid approximately $23,000 towards the $80,000 stated purchase price for the purchase 
of the Property. Though Barraza never paid the remaining sums due and owing under the 
alleged contract for sale, title was quieted in his name. 1 Thus, Barraza claims title to the Property 
when, even by his own admissions, he has only paid approximately one-fourth of the stated 
purchase price. This is not the type of windfall contemplated by our justice system and, indeed, 
demonstrates that something went woefully amiss in the litigation where title was quieted in 
defendant Bernardino Barraza's name (see Juan Manuel Cuevas, et al. v. Bernardino Barraza, et 
al., Third Judicial District (Canyon County) Case #CV-07-3536, the "Underlying Litigation"). 
The present lawsuit and pending motion for summary judgment take issue with 
the procedural defects and irregularities that occurred the Underlying Litigation. As currently 
framed by the pleadings, this Court must decide two relatively simple issues: (1) is the judgment 
entered in the Underlying Litigation valid, and (2) if so, does such judgment have a preclusive 
effect against W. Cuevas in this action? If this Court answers either of these questions in the 
negative, then it must disregard the judgment entered in the Underlying Litigation and address 
1 Significantly, the Court of Appeals noted in its decision that the allegations set forth in 
Barraza's Counterclaim stated a cause of action entitling him to specific performance of the 
contract. Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza ("Barraza Aff."), Ex. G at 9. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
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the merits of the pending action, which clearly and conclusively establish that W. Cuevas is the 
rightful owner of the Property. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. The Judgment Entered in the Underlying Litigation is Not Valid. 
Due to the procedural defects and irregularities in the Underlying Litigation, there 
are at least three separate, independent bases for this Court to determine that the judgment and 
order quieting title is not valid: First, the Answer and Counterclaim pursuant to which the 
judgment were allegedly entered was not properly served upon Juan Cuevas, plaintiff in the 
Underlying Litigation. Second, the Answer and Counterclaim was not properly filed in the 
Underlying Litigation. Third, the judgment entered in the Underlying Litigation was not 
responsive to the pleadings. Each of these three defects is jurisdictional and establishes that the 
court had no authority to enter the default judgment. If this Court finds that any one of these 
three defects or irregularities occurred, the judgment entered in the Underlying Litigation is void 
and of no force or effect. 
1. The Answer and Counterclaim was not properly served on Juan 
Cuevas, plaintiff in the Underlying Litigation. 
The first independent basis for finding the judgment and order quieting title in the 
Underlying Litigation void is that the court did not obtain jurisdiction over Juan Cuevas 
regarding the claims asserted in the counterclaim because the counterclaim was never properly 
served on Juan Cuevas. Service of process is necessary to obtain personal jurisdiction over a 
party against whom a claim is asserted. See Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 646 Idaho 217 
(1984). Generally, where a counterclaim is asserted against a plaintiff, service of process is not 
necessary because service can be made on the plaintiffs attorney in accordance with Idaho Rule 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 
000240 
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of Civil Procedure 5(a). However, when default is sought for failure of a party to appear, Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 5(a) requires that service of the new or additional claims for relief set 
forth in the counterclaim be made in accordance with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 4, i.e., 
personal service of summons. 
Barraza argues that Juan Cuevas was properly served with the Answer and 
Counterclaim in the Underlying Litigation because Juan Cuevas' attorney was served with the 
same on May 23, 2007, when it was attached to the affidavit of counsel in support of the motion 
to set aside default. The Court of Appeals has expressly noted that this is insufficient to 
constitute service: "Service of a motion for leave to file a counterclaim, even with the proposed 
counterclaim attached, is not the equivalent of service of the counterclaim itself." Viafax Corp. 
v. Stuckenbrock, 124 Idaho 65, 70, 995 P.2d 835, 840 (Ct. App. 2000). 
Moreover, at the time of this alleged service, default had been entered against 
Barraza in the Underlying Litigation. At such time, Barraza did not have authority to either 
serve or file the Answer and Counterclaim: "Filing and service of the counterclaim itself could 
be properly accomplished only after permission had been obtained by the court." Viafax Corp. v. 
Stuckenbrock, 134 Idaho 65, 995 P.2d 835 (Ct. App. 2000). Barraza has not cited to any legal 
authority to dispute this proposition. Barraza cannot, therefore, rely on the service to Juan 
Cuevas' attorney that allegedly took place May 23, 2007, because at that time the court had not 
granted him permission to file and/or serve the Answer and Counterclaim. 
The earliest date that it can be said that Barraza had permission to serve the 
Answer and Counterclaim was when Court of Appeals entered its opinion in June 24, 2008, 
reversing the district court's denial of Barraza's motion to set aside default. This opinion was 
entered more than one year after the alleged service that Barraza relies upon had been made. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
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Barraza did not attempt to re-serve the Answer and Counterclaim at any time after June 24, 2008. 
Because Barraza did not serve the Answer and Counterclaim after he had permission from a 
court to do so, Barraza cannot claim that the Answer and Counterclaim was ever properly served. 
As further support for the position that the Answer and Counterclaim was never 
served upon Juan Cuevas in the Underlying Litigation, this Court need only consider the 
following unanswerable question: If Juan Cuevas was served with the Counterclaim, on what 
date was his answer to the same due? Under I.R.C.P. 12(a), "the plaintiff shall serve a reply to a 
counterclaim in the answer within twenty (20) days after service of the answer or, if a reply is 
ordered by the Court, within twenty (20) days after service of the order .... " ( emphasis added). 
The fact that this question cannot be answered conclusively establishes that the Answer and 
Counterclaim was never served on Juan Cuevas and that the court never entered an order 
deeming the Answer and Counterclaim to have been served. 2 
Because the Answer and Counterclaim was not served upon Juan Cuevas, the 
court did not have jurisdiction to grant the affirmative reliefrequested therein. Accordingly, the 
default judgment entered upon such Answer and Counterclaim is void and ofno force and effect. 
2. The Answer and Counterclaim was never filed in the Underlying 
Litigation. 
The second independent basis for finding the judgment and order entered in the 
Underlying Litigation to be invalid is that the Answer and Counterclaim was never filed with the 
2 Looking again at the Court of Appeals Order, it is clear that the Court of Appeals 
contemplated that the district court would take some further action to formally grant permission 
to Barraza to file the Answer and Counterclaim: "After the default is set aside, Barraza's 
additional affirmative defenses and counterclaims will be more properly addressed by the district 
court in the first instance." Barraza Aff., Ex. G at 10. Significantly, in reviewing the register of 
actions, it does not even appear as though the district court took the necessary step of entering an 
order to set aside default, as was mandated by the Court of Appeals. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
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court. As evidence that the Answer and Counterclaim was never filed with the court, W. Cuevas 
has directed this Court's attention to several documents. First, the register of action for the 
Underlying Litigation is completely devoid of any indication that the Answer and Counterclaim 
was filed. Second, the Answer and Counterclaim itself, which is only in the record as an 
attachment to the affidavit of counsel in support of the motion to set aside default, lacks a stamp 
indicating a date on which it was filed. The filing stamp appears only on the affidavit of counsel, 
the document to which the Answer and Counterclaim is attached. Third, the affidavit of counsel 
expressly notes that the Answer and Counterclaim is only a proposed Answer and Counterclaim 
and seeks permission to file the attached Answer and Counterclaim. See Memorandum in 
Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Appendix C, Affidavit of Counsel in 
Support of Motion to Set Aside Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(b), ~~ 6 and 7. "Filing and 
service of the counterclaim itself could be properly accomplished only after permission had been 
obtained by the court." Via/ax Corp. v. Stuckenbrock, 134 Idaho 65, 995 P.2d 835 (Ct App. 
2000). Because Barraza was only seeking permission to file the Answer and Counterclaim at the 
time he lodged the same with the court, the alleged May 23, 2007, filing does not satisfy Idaho's 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Significantly, there is no order in the Underlying Litigation that purports to deem 
the Answer and Counterclaim attached to the affidavit of counsel as filed at any point in that 
litigation. Barraza cites to I.R.C.P. 5(e), which provides that a judge may accept pleadings for 
filing, which requires that the judge shall then "note thereon the filing date, hour and minute and 
forthwith transmit them to the office of the clerk." Barraza then points to the quiet title judgment 
in which the court notes that it has "reviewed the record and file in this action and the Answer 
and Counterclaim of Defendant, Bernardino Barraza .... " Answering Brief in Opposition to W. 
REPLY MEMOR.Ai~DUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
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Cuevas' Motion for Summary Judgment at 7. This recitation does not satisfy the filing 
requirements of I.R.C.P. 5(e). Simply put, Barraza has pointed to no evidence indicating that the 
Answer and Counterclaim was ever properly filed or that the court entered an order deeming the 
same to have been filed. Because the Answer and Counterclaim was never properly filed with 
the court in the Underlying Litigation, the court had no jurisdiction to grant relief on the claims 
set forth in such pleadings. 
3. The judgment and order entered in the Underlying Litigation was not 
responsive to the pleadings. 
As the third independent basis for finding that the judgment in the underlying 
litigation was invalid, this Court may look to the fact that the order entered was not responsive to 
the pleadings. As already noted herein, the default judgment obtained by Barraza in the 
Underlying Litigation is the functional equivalent of winning $60,000 in the litigation lottery. 
Barraza obtained title to Property which, by his own admissions, he agreed to pay $80,000 for 
when he only paid approximately $23,000 toward the purchase price. Assuming, arguendo, that 
all facts set forth in the proposed Answer and Counterclaim are true, Barraza failed to plead facts 
that would grant him title to the Property without, at the very least, paying the remaining balance 
of due and owing towards the purchase price. 3 Because the default judgment and order entered 
did not take into account the approximately $60,000 remaining on the purchase price, which 
remaining balance was set forth in Barraza's pleadings, it cannot be said that the order entered 
was responsive to the pleadings. Accordingly, based on the authority of Martin v. Soden, the 
judgment, which granted relief beyond the issues tendered by the pleadings, was entered without 
jurisdiction and is, therefore, void. 81 Idaho 274,281, 340, P.2d 848, 852 (1959) ("It is, of 
3 See Court of Appeals' comments discussed at footnote 1, infra. 
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course, fundamental that a judgment must be responsive, not only to the prayer, but to the issues 
tendered by the pleadings."). 
B. The Judgment Entered in the Underlying Litigation Does Not Have 
Preclusive Effect Against W. Cuevas. 
Even if this Court were to find, despite the numerous procedural defects and 
irregularities, that the judgment entered in the Underlying Litigation is valid, this Court may still 
address the merits of the present matter because the judgment entered in the Underlying 
Litigation does not have a preclusive effect against W. Cuevas. The critical question regarding 
whether the judgment entered in the Underlying Litigation is whether W. Cuevas was in privity 
with Juan Cuevas for purposes of the previous quiet title judgment. The question of privity turns 
on the dual question of when W. Cuevas obtained his interest in the Property and when an action 
affecting title to the Property was commenced. While Barraza attempts to limit this inquiry to 
when W. Cuevas obtained title to the Property, the focus is not that narrow. The rule, as stated in 
Sartain v. Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc., 116 Idaho 269,272, 775 P.2d 161, 164 (1989), requires only 
that the third party acquire rights in the property, not actual title to the property. In this case, it is 
indisputable that W. Cuevas acquired rights in the Property before the litigation began; the 
dispute, to the extent that one exists, is with respect to the nature and extent of rights obtained by 
W. Cuevas prior to commencement of the Underlying Litigation. 4 While W. Cuevas maintains 
that he had the rights of a vendee to a land sale contract, Barraza's affidavit suggests that W. 
4 To the extent there is a disputed issue of fact, such dispute involves the nature of the 
rights acquired by W. Cuevas prior to the time the action was commenced. While W. Cuevas 
maintains that he had been purchasing the Property from Juan Cuevas under an oral contract 
since 2003, Barraza claims that he understood W. Cuevas to be simply leasing the Property from 
Juan Cuevas at the time Juan Cuevas commenced the litigation seeking to quiet title to remove 
the cloud created by Barr~a' s improper lien. 
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Cuevas only had rights of a lessee. At best, these conflicting versions of events create an 
genuine issue of fact that would not be appropriately decided on a motion for summary 
judgment. 
However, the question regarding the preclusive effect of the judgment in the 
Underlying Litigation may be resolved, as a matter of law, regardless of this factual dispute 
because, regardless of the nature ofW. Cuevas' interest in the Property at the time the Complaint 
was filed, he clearly had title to the Property prior to the time the action affecting the Property 
had commenced. The rule, as stated in Sartain, is that "if a third party acquires rights to the 
property before receiving actual notice that an action affecting title to property has been filed ... 
the third party is not bound by the subsequent judgment." Id. This raises the question of when 
the "action affecting title to property" in the Underlying Litigation was filed. Barraza maintains 
that the "action affecting title to property" was filed at the time Juan Cuevas filed the Complaint. 
However, the judgment and decree quieting title that was ultimately entered was not based on 
Juan Cuevas' Complaint. Since there was no relief entered on the Complaint, the date of filing 
the Complaint cannot be the date an "action affecting title to property" was commenced. 
The judgment and decree quieting title in the Underlying Litigation was entered 
pursuant to Barraza's Answer and Counterclaim. Accordingly, the date the Answer and 
Counterclaim was filed establishes the date that the "action affecting title to the property'' was 
commenced. As discussed above, W. Cuevas maintains that, as a matter oflaw, such 
Counterclaim was never properly filed and the judgment entered thereon is invalid. However, if 
this Court disagrees and determines that the Answer and Counterclaim was either filed or 
deemed filed, the earliest possible date that the Answer and Counterclaim might be deemed to 
have been filed is the date that the Court of Appeals entered its decision and order reversing the 
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district court's denial ofBarraza's motion to set aside the default judgment that was entered 
against him: June 24, 2008. The quitclaim deed transferring title to the Property to W. Cuevas 
was recorded on June 20, 2007, more than a year before Barraza received permission from the 
Court of Appeals to file the Answer and Counterclaim thereby commencing the action that 
ultimately affected the Property. Because W. Cuevas obtained title to the Property prior to the 
earliest possible date Barraza could, conceivably, have been deemed to filed the Counterclaim, 
W. Cuevas cannot be said to have been "in privity" with Juan Cuevas for purposes of res 
judicata. 
From a practical standpoint, the analysis set forth herein is the only one that can 
ensure that all parties with an interest in the property had the ability to protect their rights 
throughout the pendency of the litigation. After default judgment was entered quieting title in 
favor of Juan Cuevas, Juan Cuevas transferred title to the Property. At such time, the status of 
the litigation was uncertain, at best. There was nothing in the land records so much as indicating 
that a dispute was pending with respect to the Property.5 Though a motion to set aside default 
was subsequently filed, it was initially denied by the district court and that decision was not 
reversed on appeal until over one year later. At the time the Court of Appeals reversed the 
district court's order- theoretically giving Barraza permission to file the Answer and 
Counterclaim, though further action by the district court was necessary - Barraza had the duty to 
file and serve the same, which he failed to do. Also, given that Barraza had not previously filed 
5 The suggestion that title to the property was transferred by quitclaim deed because W. 
Cuevas could not obtain title insurance due to the lien filed by Barraza and the existence of the 
pending litigation, no notice of which appeared in the land records, is speculative at best. There 
is no evidence in the record supporting this conclusion and Barraza has cited to no authority that 
a quitclaim deed conveying title to property has any less force and effect than a warranty deed. 
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a lis pendens, it would have been prudent for Barraza to conduct a title search and ensure that no 
other persons or entities were claiming title to the Property at the time the Answer and 
Counterclaim was filed. 
In short, the procedural defects and irregularities set forth herein are unique and 
unusual only because there are well-established mechanisms available to a party standing in 
Barraza's shoes that would help protect him at every stage of the litigation. As a non-party and 
non-attorney who understood that the Underlying Litigation had quieted title in favor of Juan 
Cuevas and who was relying on the land records to keep him apprised of the status of title to the 
Property, these same protections and procedures were not available to W. Cuevas and he was 
prejudiced by Barraza's failure to comply with these procedural formalities. Accordingly, as a 
matter of equity and good conscience, the negative effects of the procedural defects and 
irregularities in the Underlying Litigation should be borne by Barraza, not W. Cuevas. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, W. Cuevas respectfully requests that this Court find the 
judgment entered in the underlying litigation is invalid and/or has no preclusive effect regarding 
W. Cuevas' rights to the Property. Addressing the merits of the case, W. Cuevas respectfully 
requests that title to the Property be quieting in his name. 
DATED this 27th day of October, 2009. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
By 72---C ~ ~ 
R~becca A. Rainey - ofthe" 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th day of October, 2009, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Robert Ward 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
340 East 2nd North 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Facsimile (208) 587-3144 
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(~ Facsimile 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
i. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
WILFRJDO CUEVAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
and spouse (if any); LIOBALDO GARZA, an 
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I 
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS 
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN 
EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN AS 
29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV09-8 l 75 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
On September 22, 2009, Plaintiff Wilfrido Cuevas ("Cuevas") filed a motion for 
summary judgment ("Motion") pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Cuevas requested 
a holding that the judgment quieting title in favor of Defendant Bernardino Barraza ("Barraza") 
entered in Case No. CV-07-3536 is void and, alternatively, a judgment that resjudicata does not 
bar Cuevas from asserting his interest in the Property that is subject to the dispute in the above-
captioned action. 
On October 21, 2009, Barraza filed an Objection and Motion to Strike the 
Affidavit ofWilfrido Cuevas filed in support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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Both Motions were fully briefed and addressed by the parties. Oral argument on 
both Motions was held on November 3, 2009, before the Honorable Judge Gregory Culet at the 
Canyon County Courthouse. Based upon the argument of the parties and the pleadings and 
affidavits on file with the Court, the findings and conclusions rendered by the Court at such 
hearing, and good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED and this does order that Defendant's Objection and 
Motion to Strike is DENIED; 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED and this does order that Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as follows: 
1. Cuevas' request that the judgment entered in Case No. CV-07-3536 
quieting title in favor of Barraza be declared void and of no force and effect is GRANTED; 
2. Cuevas' request that the judgment entered in Case No. CV-07-3536 not 
operate as res Judicata and not have a preclusive effect so as to bar the claims for relief set forth 
in the above-captioned matter is GRANTED. 
DATED this!]__ day of November, 2009. 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
000251. 
Client:1421668.1 
' 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ day of November, 2009, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
MOFFA IT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701-0829 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Robert Ward 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
340 East 2nd North 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Facsimile (208) 587-3144 
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza 
~U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
,MU.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Clerk of the Court 
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Sent By: HALL, FRIEDLY & WAR 208 587 3144; 
ROBERT WARD 
HALL, FRJElJL Y & WARD 
A rtorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza 
340 East 2nd North Street 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-4412 
Facsimile: (208) 587-3144 
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16:04; 
_F __ I A~M 
NOV 2 O 2009 
CANYON COUNTY CLEAi< 
D.BUTLER,DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF CANYON 
Wil.FRIDO CUEVAS, an individual, 
Plaintiff., 
vs. 
RRRNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
and spouse (if any), LJOBALDO GARZA, an 
individual and spouse (if W1y); DOES I 
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS 
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBF.D 
IN EXHIBIT "A'\ COMMONLY KNOWN 
AS 29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA. IDAHO, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV09~8175 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
AND/OR TO CLARIFY ORDER 
GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW BRRNARDlNO BARRAZA, Defendan.t herein, by and through his 
attorney of record, Robert Ward of the firm Hall, Friedly & Ward, and pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
Rule l l(a)(2) hereby moves the Court to reconsider and/or clarify its Order Granting 
Plainliff's Motion for Summary Judgmenl entered on November 10, 2009, for the reason 
that Defendant believes the current order does not reflect the Court's ruling at the hearing 
on November 3, 2009. It was Defendant's understanding that the Court ruled that the prior 
judgment in Case No. CV*07-3536 was void only as to Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas. 
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza. previously submitted a proposed order to the Court via 
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facsimile the same day Defendant received Plaintiffs proposed order, which he believes 
more accurately reflects the Court' .s ruling. 
The Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as currently worded 
may cause an absurd result. Upon Defendant, Bemardino Barraza. proving that he is the 
rightful owner of the property in the present case, he would th1;m have to re-litigate the prior 
Case No. CV-07-3536 against Juan Cueva.:; even though no motion to set aside judgmt:11t 
nor an appeal was ever filed. 
DATED this _.2:!2..._ day of November, 2009. 
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I HER.EBY CERTIFY that upon the rf!-l) day of November, 2009, I caused to be 
served a true und correct copy of Motion to Reconsider and/or Clarify Order Onm.Ling 
Plaintiff's Motion for Swnmary Judgment by the method indicated below, addressed to the 
fbllowing: 
REBECCA A. RAINEY 
MOFFA TI, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK 
& FIELDS, CHTD. 
P.O. BOX829 
BOISE. ID 83 701 
FAX: (208) 385-5384 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
___L'Overnight Mail 
V FAX . 
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Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
and spouse (if any), LIO BALDO GARZA, an 
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I 
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS 
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED 
IN EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN 
AS 29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO, 
Defendants. 
ANSWER 
Case No. CV09-8175 
AMENDED ANSWER 
AND COUNTERCLAIM 
COMES NOW, Defendant Bernardino Barraza, by and through his attorney of 
record, Robert Ward of the firm Hall, Friedly & Ward, and in answer to the Complaint to 
Quiet Title filed herein by the Plaintiff, admits, denies and alleges as follows: 
I 
The Defendant denies each and every allegation of the Complaint for Quiet Title 
not hereinafter specifically admitted. 
II 
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II 
Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of 
Plaintiffs Complaint to Quiet Title. 
III 
Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 25 of Plaintiffs Complaint 
to Quiet Title. 
IV 
In response to paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs Complaint to Quiet Title, Defendant admits 
that a Quitclaim Deed was recorded purporting that Juan Cuevas and Yrene Baez were 
quitclaiming whatever interest they may have in said Subject Property to Plaintiff. 
V 
In response to paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs Complaint to Quiet Title, Defendant admits 
Plaintiff has been in possession of said Subject Property. 
VI 
In response to paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs Complaint to Quiet Title, Defendant 
admits in the Spring of 2009, Plaintiff attempted to pay the property taxes associated with 
the Subject Property and was informed by an individual at the office of the tax assessor that 
Plaintiff no longer held title to the Subject Property by virtue of the "Judgment and Decree 
Quieting Title" entered in Case No. CV-07-3536 in favor of Defendant, Bernardino 
Barraza. 
VII 
In response to paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs Complaint to Quiet Title, Defendant 
admits that Plaintiff is currently in possession of the Subject Property. 
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VIII 
In response to Plaintiffs First Claim for Relief (Quiet Title) of Plaintiffs 
Complaint to Quiet Title, Defendant admits that Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, has 
claimed an ownership interest and is the legal owner of the subject property. 
IX 
In response to Plaintiffs Second Claim for Relief (Quantum Meruit/Unjust 
Enrichment) of Plaintiffs Complaint to Quiet Title, Defendant admits .that Defendant, 
Bernardino Barraza, entered into a contract with Juan Cuevas which was litigated in 
Canyon County Case No. CV-07-3536, which resulted in a judgment quieting title to the 
Subject Property in Defendant, Bernardino Barraza's, name. Defendant denies the 
remainder of said claim. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Unclean hands in that Plaintiff received the Quitclaim Deed during litigation 
between his predecessor in interest and Defendant, and took no action to notify Defendant 
of any possible transfer of any interest. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff should be equitably estopped from claiming any intere·st in the Subject 
Property. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFNSE 
Resjudicata in that ownership of the Subject Property was already adjudicated. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff could not acquire by Quitclaim Deed ownership of the Subject Property 
since his predecessor in title was not the owner of the property. 
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FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff should be estopped from claiming any equitable remedy of unjust 
enrichment due to Plaintiff's unclean hands. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is not the real party in interest regarding any contract which was never 
assigned to Plaintiff. 
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff was aware of the previous quiet title action between his predecessor in 
interest and Defendant, and was named as one of the possible claimants Does 1-X, and took 
no action to protect any interest he may have had. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
For cause of action against the Plaintiff, the Defendant Bernardino Barraza 
complains and alleges as follows: 
I 
The Plaintiff, to the best of Defendant's knowledge, is a resident of Canyon 
County, Idaho. 
II 
The Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, is now and has been during all of the times 
mentioned herein a resident of Canyon County, Idaho. 
II 
II 
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III 
The subject of this litigation is real property located in Canyon County, Idaho, more 
particularly described as follows: 
A part of the Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter, Section 19, Township 6 
North, Range 5 West, Boise Meridian, Canyon County, Idaho, more particularly 
described to-wit: 
Commencing at the Southwest corner of the Southwest Quarter of the Southeast 
Quarter, Section 19, Township 6 North, Range 5 West, Boise Meridian, the 
INITIAL POINT of this description; thence 
North 0°07' East 924 feet, along the West line of the said Southwest Quarter of the 
Southeast Quarter; thence 
South 55°15' East 336.82 feet; thence 
South 0°07' West 730 feet, parallel to the said West line, to a point on the South 
line of the said Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter; thence 
South 89°35' West 277.15 feet, along the said South line to the INITIAL POINT 
OF THIS DESCRIPTION. 
IV 
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, claims an interest in the subject property and is the 
rightful owner of said property. 
V 
Plaintiff claims an ownership interest adverse to Defendant, Bernardino Barraza. 
VI 
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, is entitled to an order from this Court granting 
Defendant quiet title to the subject property. 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
VII 
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, purchased the subject property from the parties' 
predecessor in interest and paid a valuable consideration. 
II 
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VIII 
Plaintiff also claims to have purchased the subject property from the parties' 
predecessor in interest but has only paid rent with no additional funds to apply towards the 
purchase price. 
IX 
It would be inequitable and a windfall to Plaintiff to allow Plaintiff to obtain title to 
the subject property over the claims of the Defendant, Bernardino Barraza. 
X 
Defendant has retained the law firm of Hall, Friedly & Ward, of Mountain Home, 
Idaho to defend this action on his behalf and has agreed to pay said attorneys a reasonable 
fee for their services. 
WHEREFORE, the Defendant prays for judgment as follows: 
1. That Plaintiffs Complaint to Quiet Title be dismissed; 
2. That Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, be awarded quiet title to the subject 
property; 
3. That Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, be awarded his reasonable attorney fees 
and costs incurred in this action; and 
4. That the court grant such other and further relief to the Defendant, Bernardino 
Barraza, as it shall deem proper. 
DATED this 1!4- day of December, 2009. 
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Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino 
Barraza 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that upon the £ day of December, 2009, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of Amended Answer and Counterclaim by the method 
indicated below, addressed to the following: 
REBECCA A. RAINEY 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK 
& FIELDS, CHTD. 
P.O. BOX 829 
BOISE, ID 83701 
FAX: (208) 385-5384 
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Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
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Mark C. Peterson, ISB No. 6477 
Rebecca A. Rainey, ISB No. 7525 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIBLDS, CHARTERED 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 rf_ (') \ I L E D 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384 ~.M. __ _..PM. 
mcp@moffatt.com 
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COMES NOW plaintiff/counterdefendant Wilfrido Cuevas {"W. Cuevas"). by 
and through undersigned counsel of record. and hereby answers and responds to defendant/ 
counterclaimant Bernardino Barraza's {"Barraza") Counterclaim ("Counterclaim") as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Barraza's Counterclaim fails to state a claim against W. Cuevas upon which relief 
can be granted and shou1d be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b){6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
1. W. Cuevas denies each and every allegation ofBarraza.'s Counterclaim 
not herein express]y and specifically admitted. 
2. W. Cuevas lacks sufficient infonnation and knowledge to either admit or 
deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 2 of the Counterclaim, and therefore denies the 
same. 
3. W. Cuevas admits the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the 
Com1terclaim. 
4. W. Cuevas denies the allegations contained in Paragraphs 6, 7 and 9 of the 
Counterclaim. 
5. As to the allegations contained in Paragraph 4 of the Counterclaim, 
W. Cuevas admits only that Barraza is claiming an interest in the subject property. W. Cuevas 
denies that Barraza has a valid interest in the subject property and denies that Barraza is the 
rightful owner of said property. 
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6. As to the allegations contained in Paragraph 5 of the Counterclaim, 
W. Cuevas admits that Barraza is claiming an ownership interest in the subject property. 
W. Cuevas denies the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 5 of the Counterclaim, to the 
extent Paragraph 5 implies Barraza has a valid ownership interest in the subject property. 
7. As to the allegations contained in Paragraph 8 of the Counterclaim, 
W. Cuevas admits only that he purchased the subject property. W. Cuevas denies the remaining 
allegations contained in Paragraph 8. 
8. As to the allegations contained in Paragraph 10 of the Counterclaim, 
W. Cuevas denies that Barraza is entitled to any award of attorneys' fees in this matter. 
9. W. Cuevas denies Barraza's prayer for relief. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Barraza's claims are barred in whole or in part by waiver and estoppel. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
Barraza's claims are barred in whole or in part by the doctrine of unclean hands . 
. FIFl'H DEFENSE 
Barraza's claims are barred in whole or in part by the doctrine oflaches. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
Barraza's claims are barred to the extent he failed to mitigate his damages as 
required by law. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
Barraza's alleged damages, if any, were caused by the acts or omissions of 
persons or entities other than W. Cuevas, over whom he had no control, and for whom he had no 
responsibility. 
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EIGHTH DEFENSE 
Barraza's claims are to be barred by the statute of limitations. 
NINTH DEFENSE 
Barraza's claims are barred in whole or in part based upon the doctrine of unjust 
enrichment. 
TENTH DEFENSE 
Barraza's claims are barred in whole or in part by the statute of frauds. 
ELEVENTH DEFENSE 
Discovery is ongoing in this case and may disclose the existence of further and 
additional defenses. W. Cuevas, therefore, reserves the right to seek leave of the court to amend 
its answer to include additional defenses as deemed appropriate. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES 
W. Cuevas has been required to retain the services of an attorney in order to 
defend against Barraza's Counterclaim·and is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of 
suit pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-120, 12-121 and 12-123, and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and any other state and federal statutes and/or regulations or law which may 
apply. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff/counterdefendant W. Cuevas prays for judgment as 
follows: 
1. That defendant/counterclaimant Bernardino Barraza's Counterclaim be 
dismissed, with prejudice, without granting any of the relief requested therein; 
2. That the Court grant plaintiff/counterdeferidant W. Cuevas his costs and 
expenses, including appropriate and reasonable attorneys• fees, pursuant to Idaho Code 
ANSWER TO DEFENDANT BERNARDINO 
BARRAZA'S COUNTERCLAIM - 4 
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Sections 12-120, 12-121 and 12-123, and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and any 
other state and federal statutes and/or regulations or law which may apply; 
3. That the Court grant plaintiff/counterdefendant W. Cuevas such other 
relief as the Court deems just and equitable under the circumstances. 
DATED this 7th day of January, 2010. 
ANSWER TO DEFENDANT BERNARDINO 
BARRAZA'S COUNTERCLAIM· 5 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
By ____________ _ 
Mark C. Peterson - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant 
Client 1482890.1 
000267 
, 
01/07/2010 16:30 FAX MOFFATI THOMAS ~007/007 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 7th day of January, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER TO DEFENDANT BERNARDINO BARRAZA'S 
COUNTERCLAIM to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Robert Ward 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
340 East 2nd North 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Facsimile (208) 587-3144 
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Ba"aza 
ANSWER TO DEFENDANT BERNARDINO 
BARRAZA'S COUNTERCLAIM - 6 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(~ Facsimile 
Mark C. Peterson 
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Mark C. Peterson. ISB No. 6477 
Rebecca A. Rainey, ISB No. 7525 
MOFFA'IT, TuOMAS, BARRETI, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
mcp@moffatt.com 
rar@moffatt.com 
24163.0000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant 
_F_l_,~.kAJt~1. 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
D. DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE THIRD nJDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
and spouse (if any); LIOBALDO GARZA, an 
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I 
THROUGH X. UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS 
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN 
EXFllBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN AS 
29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO, 
Defendants. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA; 
Counterclaim.ant, 
vs. 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, 
Counterdefendant. 
Case No. CV09-8175 
Wll..FRIDO CUEVAS' 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA'S MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER AND/OR CLARIFY 
ORDER 
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COMES NOW plaintiff/counterdefendant Wilfrido Cuevas, by and through 
undersigned counsel of record, and hereby files this memorandum in opposition to defendant 
Bernardino Barraza's motion to reconsider and/or clarify order. 
Defendant/Counterclaimant Bernardino Barraza (hereafter "Defendant") has filed 
a motion to reconsider and/or clarify asking this court to limit its order declaring the order 
entered in Case No. CV-07-3536 as void to an order declaring the same as void only as to 
plaintiff/counterdefendant Wilfrido Cuevas. Defendant's motion should be denied for the 
reasons that a void judgment is a legal nullity and void as against all parties for all purposes. 
See, e.g., Prather v. Loyd, 86 Idaho 45, 50,382 P.2d 910, 912-13 (1963) ("A void judgment is a 
nullity, and no rights can be based thereon; it can be set aside on motion or can be collaterally 
attacked at any time.") ( citations omitted). "Moid judgments may be attacked at any time .... " 
Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 486, 65 P.3d 502, 508 (2003) (citing Burnham v. Superior 
Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990)). "A void judgment ... may be entirely disregarded or 
declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it . . . . It may .be 
attacked by a person adversely affected by it, in any proceeding, direct or collateral, and at any 
time." Martin v. Soden, 81 Idaho 274, 281, 340 P.2d 848, 852 (1959) (quoting JOA AM. JUR. 
Judgments § 45). 
Because a void judgment may be collaterally attacked at any time by any person 
aggrieved by the same, the fact that Juan Cuevas, plaintiff/counterdefendant in the underlying 
Case No. CV-07-3536, did not file a motion to set aside the judgment and/or file an appeal is 
wl!,olly irrelevant and has no bearing on the nature· or scope of the present order. The order 
W1LFRIDO CUEVAS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSfflON TO BERNARDINO 
BARRAZA'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND/OR AMEND - 2 c111n1:1,111,1~.1 
000270 
01/21/2010 15:21 FAX MOFFATI THOMAS laJ 004/005 
,, 
entered on the motion for summary judgment is appropriate as written and. therefore, 
Defendant's motion to reconsider amend or clarify such order should be denied. 
DATED this 21st day of January, 2010. 
MOFFA IT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIBLDS, CHARTER.ED 
ByLe-'F'---
Mark C. Peterson - Of the Finn 
Attorneys for Plaintifti'Countcrdefendant 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSffiON TO BERNARDINO 
BARRAZA,S MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND/OR AMEND - 3 c11w1tm1,m.1 
000271. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 21st day of January, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing WILFRIDO CUEVAS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO BERNARDINO BARRAZA•S MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND/OR CLARIFY 
ORDER to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Robert Ward 
HALL, FRmDLY & WARD 
340 East 2nd North 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Facsimile (208) 587-3144 
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(X) Facsimile 
Mark C. Peterson 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSfflON TO BERNARDINO 
BARRAZA'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND/OR AMEND - 4 c11ant14111c11.1 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
PRESIDING: GREGORY M. CULET DATE: JANUARY 28, 2010 
WILFRIDO DURAN CUEVAS, ) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
BERNARDINO FLORES BARRAZA, JR. etal ) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant. ) ________________ ) 
COURT MINUTE 
CASE NO: CV-2009-8175-C 
REPORTED BY: Debora Kreidler 
TIME: 9:00 A.M. 
DCRT1 (11:10-11:39) 
This having been the time heretofore set for motion hearing in the above 
entitled matter. The plaintiff was not present in court but represented by counsel Ms. 
Rebecca Rainey via telephone; the defendant was not present in court, but represented 
by counsel Mr. Robert Ward via telephone. 
In answer to the Court's inquiry, each of counsel indicated they were ready to 
proceed. 
Mr. Ward presented argument in support of the defense's Motion to Reconsider. 
The Court reviewed the portion of the transcript of which the Court made it's 
ruling, and inquired of counsel what was the distinguishing factor in the case regarding 
viafax. 
Mr. Ward presented further argument in support of the motion. 
COURT MINUTES Page 1 
JANUARY 28, 2010 
000273 
The Court reviewed footnote five (5) in the viafax case. 
Ms. Rainey presented argument in opposition of the defense's Motion to 
Reconsider. 
Mr. Ward presented further argument in support of the motion. 
The Court presented Findings, Facts, and Conclusions of Law and denied the 
defense's Motion to Reconsider. 
The Court addressed counsel regarding contact from Justice Trout requesting a 
copy of the Court's order on Summary Judgment prior to mediation. Further, the Court 
addressed counsel regarding submitting an amended order. 
In answer to the Court's inquiry, each of advised they did not feel the original 
order submitted was vague. 
The Court addressed counsel regarding the appeal in this case, and expressed 
opinions regarding reaching a resolution in mediation. 
In answer to the Court's inquiry, each of counsel indicated a minute entry 
indicating the Motion to Reconsider was denied was acceptable. 
The Court directed the clerk to send a copy of the minute entry from this date to 
counsel. 
The Court determined mediation was not yet set in this matter. 
Counsel indicated they understood and court adjourned. 
COURT MINUTES 
JANUARY 28, 2010 
Page 2 
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Deputy Clerk 
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( 
Mark C. Peterson, !SB No. 6477 
Rebecca A. Rainey, ISB No. 7525 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
mcp@moffatt.com 
rar@moffatt.com 
24163.0000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
and spouse (if any); LIOBALDO GARZA, an 
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I 
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS 
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN 
EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN AS 
29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO, 
Defendants. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
and spouse (if any); 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, 
Counterdefendant. 
Case No. CV09-8175 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS' SECOND 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS' SECOND MOTION FOR 
SUMMARYJUDGMENT-1 Client:1741210.1 
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COMES NOW Plaintifii'Counterdefendant Wilfrido Cuevas, by and through his 
undersigned counsel ofrecord, and hereby files this second motion for summary judgment 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56( a). By this second motion for summary judgment, 
Wilfrido Cuevas respectfully requests that this Court enter an order: 
(i) Quieting title to the Property in the name of Wilfrido Cuevas free and 
clear of any interest claimed by Defendant/Counterclaimant Bernardino Barraza; 
(ii) Ordering that Defendant/Counterclaimant Bernardino Barraza take 
nothing by his claims against Wilfrido Cuevas for unjust enrichment. 
This motion is supported by all pleadings on file in this matter, including but not 
limited to (i) this Court's Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment entered 
November 9, 2009; (ii) the Affidavit of Rebecca A. Rainey in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed September 21, 2009; (iii) the Affidavit of Wilfrido Cuevas in Support 
of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment filed September 21, 2009; (iv) the Affidavit of 
Bernardino Barraza dated October 20, 2009; (v) the Affidavit of Rebecca A. Rainey in Support 
of Wilfrido Cuevas' Second Motion for Summary Judgment, filed contemporaneously herewith, 
and (vi) the Memorandum in Support ofWilfrido Cuevas' Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed contemporaneously herewith. 
Plaintiff requests oral argument on this motion. 
DATED this 31st day of August, 2010. 
MOFFA TT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
By~·· 
Rebecca A. Rainey - Of the Fi 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Count d 
r 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS' SECOND MOTION FOR 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 31st day of August, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing WILFRIDO CUEVAS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Robert Ward 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
340 East 2nd North 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Facsimile (208) 587-3144 
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
12----f a: /~= 
R~becca A. RaineY 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS' SECOND MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 
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Mark C. Peterson, ISB No. 6477 
Rebecca A. Rainey, ISB No. 7525 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK& 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
mcp@moffatt.com 
rar@moffatt.com 
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Attorneys for Plaintif£1Counterdefendant 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUJ~TY OF CANYON 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
and spouse (if any); LIOBALDO GARZA, an 
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I 
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS 
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN 
EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN AS 
29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO, 
Defendants. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
and spouse (if any); 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, 
Counterdefendant. 
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AFFIDAVIT OF REBECCA A. RAINEY 
IN SUPPORT OFWILFRIDO CUEVAS' 
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
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( 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF ADA ) 
REBECCA A. RAINEY, having been duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states 
as follows: 
1. I am an attorney for plaintiff Wilfrido Cuevas in the above-captioned 
matter and, as such, have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit I is a true and correct copy of the Warranty 
Deed conveying the property that is the subject of the above-captioned matter to Juan M. Cuevas 
and Yrene Baez recorded in Canyon County June 15, 1993, as Recorder's Instrument No. 
9313282. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of the Response to 
Wilfrido Cuevas' First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production to Bernardino Barraza. 
The document produced as Exhibit A was produced in response to Requests for Productions Nos. 
l and 5. Specifically, Request for Production No. 5 sought "any and all documents, contracts, or 
agreements between Defendant(s), or any of them, and Juan Cuevas relating to your attempt to 
purchase the property." Exhibit A to Exhibit 2 (hereafter, the "English Document") was the only 
document produced in response to Request for Production No. 5. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is the Affidavit of Counsel in Support of 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) filed in Case No. CV-07-3536 on 
May 24, 2007. Such affidavit references an attached ''Answer and Counterclaim." Exhibit A to 
the Answer and Counterclaim contains the English Document, discussed in paragraph 3, above, 
and also contains another document, written in Spanish, which has not been produced by Barraza 
AFFIDAVIT OF REBECCA A. RAINEY IN SUPPORT OF WILFRIDO 
CUEVAS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
000279 
Client:1741218.1 
in this litigation, but which may be used by him to claim an interest in the property that is the 
subject of the above-captioned matter (hereafter, the "Spanish Document"). 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of the Affidavit of 
Translation of M. Isabel Thornton dated May 21, 2010, providing an English translation of the 
Spanish Document. 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this 31st day of August, 2010. 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 31st day of August, 2010. 
NOTARY P~LIC FOR IDAHO 
Residing at ~i1, L , J;D 
My Commission Expires 5 -J-:3>- /;>-. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
(_) I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 31st day of August, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF REBECCA A. RAINEY IN SUPPORT OF 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served 
by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
0 
( 
Robert Ward 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
340 East 2nd North 
Mountain Home, ID 83 64 7 
Facsimile (208) 587-3144 
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Rebecca A. Rainey ; 
72-e' d/~' 
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ROBERT WARD 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
Attorneys for Bernardino Barraza 
340 East 2nd North Street 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-4412 
Facsimile: (208) 587-3144 
Idaho State Bar Number 4442 
RECEIVED 
JUL 2 9 2010 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, 
ROCK & FIELDS, Cl-fTD. ' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
and spouse (if any), LIOBALDO GARZA, an 
individual and spouse {if any); DOES I 
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS 
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED 
IN EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN 
AS 29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV09-8175 
RESPONSE TO WILFRIDO 
CUEVAS' FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
TO BERNARDINO BARRAZA 
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, hereby responds to Wilfrido Cuevas' First Set of 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production to Bernardino Barraza dated May 14, 2010, 
as follows: 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Please state the name, occupation, address and 
telephone number (work and home) of each and every person who has, or purports to 
have, knowledge of any facts or issues relating to the subject matter of this action. 
RESPONSE TO WILFRIDO CUEVAS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR 
PRODUCTION TO BERNARDINO BARRAZ/\ - I 
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RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. l: 
Wilfredo Cuevas 
Bernardino Barraza 
Marta Barraza, (208) 713-3945 
Sylvestre Castaneda, (208) 467-9490 
Augostin Bergos, (909) 494-0137 
Leobardo Garza, (208) 830-2255 
Ruben Esquivel, 909-8320 
Herminia Cuevas 
Maria Cuevas 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Please state the name of each and every person you 
intend to call as a lay witness at the trial of this matter, and for each such person, state 
with particularity: 
(a) Their residence address and telephone number; 
(b) Their business address and telephone number; 
( c) Their occupation; and 
(d) The substance of their expected testimony. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, 
has not yet decided who he will call as a lay witness at the trial of this matter. Defendant 
will later supplement his response to this interrogatory. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Please state the name of each and every person you 
expect to call as an expert witness at the trial of this matter, and for each such person, 
state with particularity: 
RESPONSE TO WILFRIDO CUEVAS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR 
PRODUCTION TO BERNARDINO BARRAZA • 2 
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(a) Their residence address and telephone number; 
(b) Their business address and telephone number; 
( c) The qualifications upon which you intend to rely to establish said person 
as an expert witness; 
(d) The subject matter on which said person is expected to testify; 
( e) The substance of the facts and opinions to which he or she is expected to 
testify; and 
(f) All other information allowed for inquiry by Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, 
has not retained an expert witness at this point in time. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Please identify, by title, date and subject matter, 
each exhibit that you plan to off er into evidence at trial of this matter and the proposed 
use and relevance of each such exhibit. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, 
has not yet determined which exhibits he plans to offer into evidence at trial of this 
matter. Defendant will later supplement his response to this interrogatory. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Please identify all taxes paid by you on the property 
in question. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, 
paid taxes for the years 2000, 2001 and 2008. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Please identify all improvements made by you on 
the property. 
RESPONSE TO W!LFRIDO CUEVAS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR 
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RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, 
added a patio, sprinkler system, and grass for the yard. Further, he cleaned and made 
numerous repairs to the property, as well as reinstated the ditch rights. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: If any payment was made on the property for which· 
you do not have documentation, please identify the source of funds used for the payment, 
to whom the payment was made, on what dates, and who - other than yourself - would 
have infonnation concerning the making of such payment. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, 
made some payments to Juan Cuevas with funds he received from working, but he cannot 
recall the exact dates of said payments. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Please identify all facts that support your contention 
that all payments made by Plaintiff were for rent with no funds being applied towards the 
purchase price of the property. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, told 
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, he was only renting the property. The amount of each 
payment was in the amount of the rent. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, never had a written 
contract to purchase the property. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Please explain the circumstances that caused you to 
vacate the property. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, 
vacated the property due to Juan Cuevas threatening bodily harm to Defendant, 
Bernardino Barraza, and to his family. 
RESPONSE TO WJLFRIDO CUEVAS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR 
PRODUCTION TO BERNARDINO BARRAZA - 4 
000288 
( 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. l: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents you relied upon and/or identified in your answers to each of the above-stated 
interrogatories. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. l: Attached hereto please find a copy of the 
following documents: 
Exhibit A Purchase Agreement dated March 6, 2001 
Exhibit B Receipts for payments to Juan Cuevas 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents evidencing payments made by you to Juan Cuevas for the purchase of the 
property. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 2: Attached hereto as Exhibit B are copies of 
the receipts for payments made to Juan Cuevas by Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, by 
check or deposited into Juan Cuevas' bank account. Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, does 
not have receipts for some of the cash payments made directly to Juan Cuevas. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents showing taxes paid on the property. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 3: Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, does not 
have any documentation showing taxes he paid in the property. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents evidencing improvements made, by you, to the property. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 4: Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, does. not 
have any documentation showing improvements he made to the property. 
RESPONSE TO WILFRJDO CUEVAS' FffiST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR 
PRODUCTION TO BERNARDINO BARRAZA· 5 
000289 
Cl / 
( 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents, contracts, or agreements between Defendant(s), or any of them, and Juan 
Cuevas relating to your attempt to purchase the property. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 5: Please reference Exhibit A. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6: Please produce copies of any and all 
documents, contracts or agreements between you and Juan Cuevas relating to your 
agreement to vacate the property. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 6: Attached hereto please find a copy of the 
following documents: 
Exhibit C - Claim of Lien recorded May 6, 2002 
DATED thiscR:fi_ day of.._l.....,.__fe_~---n-----'' 2010. 
RESPONSE TO WILFRJDO CUEVAS' FIRST SET OF !NTERROGATORJES AND REQUESTS FOR 
PRODUCTION TO BERNARDINO BARRAZA • 6 
000290 
( 
STA TE OF IDAHO ) a /'l,(_J)/ c~ ) ss. 
COUNTY OF Cl .. NY0N- ) 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, being first duly sworn, deposes and states that he is 
the Defendant named in the foregoing Defendant, Bernardino Barraza's, Response to 
Wilfrido Cuevas' First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production to Bernardino 
Barraza; that he has read said responses, knows the contents thereof, and believes the 
facts therein stated to be true. 
ne;:r-4&¥:A, b<U ---is:c:YJ,,.y:,:,, 2 a 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA 
Defendant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
RESPONSE TO WJLFRIDO CUEVAS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORJES AND REQUESTS FOR 
PRODUCTION TO BERNARDINO BARRAZA - 7 
000291. 
"' ' ·" 
000292 





' ""' ··~ 
', .. () 
ST ATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF Qanyon. · ) 
CLAIM OF LIEN 
f 
l 
BEFORE ME, the undersigned Notary Public, personally appeared Bernardino Barraza and 
Liobaldo Gana , who being first duly sworn, says that he is the lienor herein or the 
agentofthelienorherein, whoseaddressis 16558 Blue Spruce Rd. Nampa, Id, 83,651. 
and that in accordance with a contract with Juan Manuel Cuevas. 
lienor furnished labor, services or materials consisting of unpaid refund in the amQJ1nt_ 
$20.000.00 for the payments on Real estate Title. 
on the following described real property in Canyon County, State ofldaho, and .more fully 
described as ''Exibit A" Attched and made part hereof. 
and owned by Juan Manuel Cuevas and Yrene Baez sigle persons. 
for a total value of Twenty thousand dllS and 00/100 dollars (S20, 000, mo 
ofwhichtherercmainsunpaidTwenty thousand dlls and 00/l0Qlo]Jars (SZ0.000.!J).O 
That the lienor fumisbed the first of the items on the fifth dayofJa.nuary , 200.L. 
and that !Jre lienor ~ished the last of the items on the fifth day of January 200.l.._. 
That the lienor served copies of the notice on the contractor on the __Ill!_ day ofinarch . 2002, 
200'_by _____________ , and on the subcontractor on the ___ day of 
:~~~:7 ieoor orlienor's Agent 
, 200_b 
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ROBERT WARD 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
Attorneys for Bernardino Barraza 
340 East 2nd North Street 
Mountain Home, Idaho 8364 7 
Telephone: (208) 587-4412 
Facsimile: (208) 587-3144 
Idaho State Bar Number 4442 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
and spouse (if any), LIO BALDO GARZA, an 
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I 
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS 
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED 
1N EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN 
I 
AS 29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO, 1 
I 
I 
I 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV09-8 l 75 
NOTICE OF SERVICE 
f.. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the cJ3_ day of July, 2010, true and correct copies 
of Defendant, Bernadina Barraza's, Response to Wilfrido Cuevas' First Set of Interrogatories 
and Requests for Production to Bernardino Barraza were served, by depositing the same in the 
United States Mail, postage prepaid, upon the following attorneys at the addresses shown below: 
REBECCA A. RAINEY 
MOFFA TT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK 
& FIELDS, CHTD. 
P.O. BOX829 
BOISE, ID 83701 
FAX: (208) 385-5384 
NOTICE OF SERVICE- I 
000300 
VU.s.Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
FAX 
0 
( 
NOTICE OF SERVICE - 2 
000301-
() 
EXHIBIT 3 
( 
000302 
) 
() 
) 
ROBERT WARD 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza 
340 East 2nd North Street 
Mountain Home, Idaho 8364 7 
Telephone: (208) 587-4412 
Facsimile: (208) 587-3144 
Idaho State Bar Nwnber 4442 
F- L E EJ __ __,A.MJ!.-) t) .P.M. 
MAY 2 4 7JJ07 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
D.BUTLEA,DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
JUAN MANUEL CUEVAS and YRENE 
BAEZ, individuals, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual, 
LIOBALDO GARZA, an individual, and 
DOES I through X, unknown claimants to the 
real property described in Exhibit "A", 
commonly known as 29452 Pearl Road, 
Parma, Idaho, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF ELMORE ) 
Case No. CV-07-3536 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
PURSUANT TO RULE 60(b) 
ROBERT WARD, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. That I am the Attorney for the Defendant Bernardino Barraza in the above-
entitled action. I make this Affidavit in Support of Defendant's Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(b). 
2. That Defendant discussed this case with me, and paid me for my legal advice; 
however, at that time, no lawsuit was filed and therefore I could not file a Notice of 
Appearance on behalf of Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO 
RULE60(b)- I 000303 
) 
3. A Complaint was later filed and Defendant was served with the Complaint, but 
did not tell me, thus, no Answer and Counterclaim was filed. 
4. Defendant believed that I was representing him after our discussions regarding 
the case, and therefore had the mistaken belief that he did not need to let me know that a 
lawsuit had been filed and a lady had given him papers as service of process. 
5. Defendant speaks very little English, cannot read or write English, and thus did 
not understand the notice in the Summons requiring him to file a responsive pleading 
within twenty (20) days. 
6. Defendant has a meritorious defense as outlined in the proposed Answer and 
Counterclaim attached hereto, and incorporated as if set forth in full herein. 
7. Defendant respectfully requests the Court to set aside the default judgment 
entered in this case and allow Defendant to file the Answer and Counterclaim attached 
( ) hereto. 
FURTHER, YOUR AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT. 
DATED this 2..:3 day of May, 2007. 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino 
Barraza (ci 
SWORN to before this ~ay of May, 2007. 
NOTARY PUBLIC,.Stat 
Residing at Mountain 
Commission Expires:__.. ______ _ 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL lN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO 
RULE60(b)-2 000304 
) 
( ) 
{ 
i 
CERTIFICATE~ S~YICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that upon the~ of May, 2007, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(b) by the method indicated below, addressed to the 
following: 
MARK D. PERISON, P.A. 
3149 S. 9TH STREET, SUITE 300 
P.O. Box 6575 
BOISE, ID 83707-6575 
(208) 331-1200 
(208) 343-5838 FAX 
/U.S.Mail 
Hand Delivered --
--Overnight Mail 
FAX 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO 
RULE60(b)-3 000305 
) 
ROBERT WARD 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza 
340 East 2nd North Street 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-4412 
Facsimile: (208) 587-3144 
Idaho State Bar Number 4442 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
JUAN MANUEL CUEVAS and YRENE 
BAEZ, individuals, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual, 
LIOBALDO GARZA, an individual, and 
DOES I through X, unknown claimants to the 
real property described in Exhibit "A", 
commonly known as 29452 Pearl Road, 
Parma, Idaho, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-07-3536 
ANSWERAND 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Fee Category: J(8)(a) 
Fee: $62.00 
ANSWER 
COMES NOW, Defendant Bernardino Barraza, by and through his attorney of 
record, Robert Ward of the firm Hall, Friedly & Ward, and in answer to the Complaint 
filed herein by the Plaintiffs, admits, denies and alleges as follows: 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAlM - l 
000306 
I. 
) The Defendant denies each and every allegation of the Complaint not hereinafter 
specifically admitted. 
II. 
Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraphs III, IV, V, VI, VII, IX, X 
and XI of Plaintiffs' Complaint to Quiet Title. 
III. 
Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs II, XII, XIII, XIV, XVI, 
XVII, XVIII and XIX of Plaintiffs' Complaint to Quiet Title. 
N. 
In response to paragraph I of Plaintiffs' Complaint to Quiet Title, Defendant admits 
only that Plaintiff Juan Manuel Cuevas is an individual currently residing in Arizona, and 
() that PlaintiffYrene Baez is an individual currently residing in Arizona. Defendant denies 
the remainder of said paragraph 
) 
V. 
In response to paragraph VIII of Plaintiffs' Complaint to Quiet Title, Defendant 
admits only that Plaintiffs' dispute that they owe Defendant money, and denies the 
remainder of said paragraph. 
VI. 
In respons'e to paragraph XV of Plaintiffs' Complaint to Quiet Title, Defendant 
admits only that Plaintiff seeks Quiet Title, and denies the remainder of said paragraph. 
ANSWER AND COUNfERCLAIM - 2 
000307 
) 
( -. 
' ) 
I,__ , 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs sold to Defendant the Property as described in Plaintiffs' Complaint to 
Quiet Ti~e; _Therefore, Defendant is the owner of the property and n~t Plaintiffs. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs should be equitably estopped from denying they sold the property to 
Plaintiff and estopped from asserting their claim for Quiet Title to the property. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
More than five years have elapsed since Plaintiff sold the property to Defendant 
therefore Plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
For cause of action against the Plaintiffs, the Defendant Bernardino Barraza 
complains and alleges as follows: 
I. 
The Plaintiffs, to the best of Defendant's knowledge, are residents of the State of 
Arizona 
II. 
The Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, is now and has been during all of the times 
mentioned herein a resident of Canyon County, Idaho. 
m. 
The subject of this litigation is real property located in Canyon County, Idaho, 
known as 29452 Pearl Road, Panna, and which is more accurately described in Exhibit A 
ANSWER AND COUNIBRCLAIM - 3 
000308 
.-
of the Plaintiffs' Complaint to Quiet Title. Exhibit A is incorporated herein by this 
) reference as if set forth in its entirety. Defendant claims an interest in said property, and 
jurisdiction is appropriate under Idaho Code § 5-514. 
() 
BREACH OF WRITTEN CONTRACT 
N. 
Plaintiff executed a written contract on March 6, 2001, wherein Plaintiff sold the 
subject real property to Defendant for eighty thousand dollars ($80,000.00). See attached 
written contract marked "Exhibit l ". 
V. 
Defendant Bernardino Barraza paid a total of twenty-two thousand six hundred 
thirty-five dollars and seventy-six cents ($22,635.76) as a down payment on the subject 
property. 
VI. 
Plaintiffs now claim the subject property was not sold to Defendant. 
VII. 
Plaintiffs have now filed a Quiet Title action, and therefore have breached the 
written contract wherein they sold the subject property to Defendant. 
BREACH OF ORAL CONTRACT 
vm. 
Plaintiffs ·promised to reimburse Defendant twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00) 
upon resale of the subject property if Defendant would vacate the subject property. 
IX. 
Defendant vacated the subject property. 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM - 4 
000309 
•,' 
) 
X. 
Plaintiffs, as of this date, have failed to reimburse Defendant the twenty thousand 
dollars ($20,000.00) as promised. 
XI. 
Plaintiffs have now filed this Quiet Title action to avoid paying Defendant twenty 
thousand dollars ($20,000.00) as promised, and therefore have breached the oral contract of 
the parties. 
BREACH OF IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT 
XII. 
Defendant incorporates paragraphs I - XII of Defendant's Counterclaim into this 
cause of action as if set forth in their entirety 
XIII. 
Defendants' actions and Plaintiffs actions as set forth above created an implied-in-
fact contract. 
XIV. 
Defendants have now breached the implied-in-fact contract by filing a quiet title 
action to avoid paying Defendant his $20,000.00. 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
xv. 
Defendant incorporates paragraphs I-XIV of Defendant's Counterclaim into this 
cause of action as if set forth in their entirety. 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM - 5 
00031.0 
' ) 
XVI. 
Plaintiffs have filed a Quiet Title action in an attemptto negate Defendant's interest 
in the property and avoid paying Defendant twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00) as 
promised, all of which would result in an unjust enrichment to Plaintiffs. 
EOUIT ABLE ESTOPPLE 
XVII 
Plaintiff represented to Defendant he would reimburse Defendant twenty thousand 
dollars ($20,000.00) if Defendant would vacate the property. 
xvm 
Plaintiff intended Defendant to act upon his representation and vacate the property. 
XIX 
Plaintiff has now filed a Quiet Title action to avoid paying Defendant the twenty 
( ) thousand dollars ($20,000.00) as represented. 
) 
xx 
Defendant was unaware that Plaintiff would refuse to reimburse him as Plaintiff 
represented. 
XXI 
Defendant relied upon Plaintiff's representation to him. 
XXII 
Defendarit acted upon Plaintiff's representation and vacated the property. 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM - 6 
00031.1. 
) 
() 
• 
' 
QUIET TITLE 
XXIII 
The defendant incorporates into this cause of action paragraphs I-XXII of 
Defendant's Counterclaim as if set forth in full. 
XXIV 
Defendant claims a cause of action against Plaintiffs and complains of Plaintiffs 
named in this action and all other persons unknown claiming any right, title, estate, lien or 
interest in the real property described adverse to plaintiff's title, and for a cause of action 
alleges the following. 
XXV 
The true names or capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate, or otherwise, 
of Cross Claimants named in this action as Does I through X are unknown to Defendant, 
who sues such Cross Claimants by such fictitious names, and Defendant will amend this 
counterclaim to show their true names and capacities, upon such ascertainment. 
XXVI 
The defendant is the owner of real property located in Canyon County, Idaho, 
known as 29452 Pearl Road, Panna, and which is more accurately described in Exhibit A 
of the Plaintiffs' Complaint to Quiet Title. Exhibit A is incorporated herein by this 
reference as if set forth in its entirety. 
xxvn 
Plaintiffs claim an interest and estate in such property adverse to Defendant; 
Plaintiffs' claim is without any right, and Plaintiffs have no right, estate, title, lien or 
interest in or to the property, or any part of it: 
ANSWER AND COUNfERCLAIM • 7 
00031.2 
/ 
' ' 
) 
. 
. • 
xxvm 
Cross Claimants Does I through Doe X, may claim some estate, right, title, lien or 
interest in or to the property adverse to Plaintiff's title, and such claim or claims constitute 
a cloud on Defendant's title to the property. 
XXIX 
Defendant has retained the law firm of Hall, Friedly & Ward of Mountain Home, 
Idaho, to prosecute this action on Defendant's behalf and has agreed to pay said attorneys a 
reasonable fee for their services. T.pe sum of$150.00 per hour is a reasonable sum to be 
paid for such attorney's fees. 
XXX 
Defendant is entitled to recover his attorney fees incurred in the prosecution of this 
counterclaim against the defendant pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 6-324, 12-120, 12-121, and 
Rule 54(e) of the Idaho Rules ofC~vil Procedure. 
XXXI 
WHEREFORE, the Defendant prays for judgment as follows: 
1. That Plaintiffs Complaint to Quiet Title be dismissed; 
2. That Plaintiffs be estopped from claiming the property was not sold to 
Defendant, or in the alternative, be ordered to reimburse Defendant twenty thousand 
dollars ($20,000.00); 
•, 
3. That the Plaintiffs be ordered to specifically perform the written contract . 
and/or oral contract; 
4. Plaintiffs, and all persons claiming under them, be required to set forth the 
nature of their claims to the described real property; 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM - 8 
00031.3 
.· 
5. All adverse claims to such real property be detennined by a decree of this 
') Court; 
) 
6. The decree adjudge that Defendant owns in fee simple, and is entitled to the 
quiet and peaceful possession of, such real property, and that Plaintiffs, and all persons 
.. . ~· " 
claiming under them, have no estate, right, title, lien, or interest in or to the real property or 
any part of it; 
7. · The decree permanently enjoin each Plaintiff, and all persons claiming 
under them, from asserting any adverse claim to Defendant's property; 
8. For costs and disbursements, including reasonable attorney fees in the 
amount of $1 S0.00 per hour; and 
9. That the court grant such other and further relief to the Defendant as it shall 
deem proper. 
DA TED this -2:l_ day of May, 2007. 
ANSWER AND COUNTER.CLAIM - 9 
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino 
Barraza 
00031.4 
.. 
) 
( ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF ELMORE, ) 
Bernardino Barraza, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he is one of the 
Defendants named in the foregoing Answer and Counterclaim, that he has read said 
. . . . 
Answer and Counterclaim, knows the contents thereof and believes the facts therein stated 
to be true. 
CERTIFICATE~:~RVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that upon the~~y of May, 2007, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of Answer and Counterclaim by the method indicated below, 
addressed to the following: 
MARK D. PERISON, P.A. 
3149 S. 9rn STREET, SUITE 300 
P.O. Box: 6575 
BOISE, ID 83707-6575 
(208) 331-1200 
(208) 343-5838 FAX 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM - 10 
/u.S.Mail 
Hand Delivered = Overnight Mail 
FAX 
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EXHIBIT 4 
) 
0003'.18 
) 
( ) 
Affidavit of Translation 
I, ~- l~I :Thdrclof\.- , am fluent in English and 
pAAL . I hereby certify that I have translated and verified the 
following document(s) which is/are attached to this Affidavit: 
Description of document(s): (title or type, document date, number of pages) 
I further certify that, to the best of my knowledge, the attached document(s) 
written in English is/are a true and ~ccurate translation of the attached 
docurnent(s) written in SfO.J\lSD . 
~u 
(Signa (Print Name) 
------------------------------------------------------------
STATE OF --12=-=~"'""""""j.._,~-.... O _____ _ 
COUNTY OF __ _..._ttz2_,__~_fr..L..-_____ _ 
s·r 
Subscribed and affirmed, or sworn to, before me on this 2/ day of 
H41 , 2010 , by H. Is&b:<1 ·zh.mn tzr:; 
(1Qfl8ture of Notary Public) (Print Name) 
My commission expires on: _()_~ .. J .;;...;1.R~· ..... /-'-t'.-'--f ___ _ 
Notary Seal: 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the present matter, both Wilfrido Cuevas ("Wilfrido") and Bernardino Barraza 
("Barraza") are claiming title to the property commonly known as 29452 Pearl Road, Parma, 
Idaho (the "Property"), through the same predecessor in interest: Juan Cuevas. 1 In order to 
establish that his title to the Property is superior to any interest claimed by Barraza, Wilfrido had 
the task of first establishing that the judgment entered in the prior litigation was either void 
and/or did not operate as res judicata regarding his interest in the Property and then establish that 
Wilfrido otherwise has superior title to the Property. The first of these issues was disposed ofby 
Wilfrido's first motion for summary judgment, granted by this Court on or about November 12, 
2009. The remaining question, and the sole remaining issue relating to title to the Property, is 
whether Wilfrido's claim of fee simple ownership in the Property is superior to any interest in 
the Property claimed by Barraza. 
In support of his claim, Wilfrido has a duly recorded quitclaim deed, executed by 
Juan Cuevas and Yrene Baez that was recorded in Canyon County on June 20, 2007, as 
Instrument No. 2007043067 (the "Quitclaim Deed"). Conversely, in support ofBarraza's 
claimed interest in the property, he has an undated document, written in Spanish, which Barraza 
alleges to be a purchase and sale contract ("Spanish Document'); a dated document, written in 
English, which Barraza alleges to be a purchase and sale contract ("English Document"); and a 
purported "Claim of Lien," generally in the form of a mechanic's and materialman's lien, 
alleging that it secures his interest in refund of a $20,000.00 down payment towards the Property. 
1 Wilfrido also claims title to the property through Yrene Baez who owned the Property 
jointly with Juan Cuevas and joined in the transfer of the Property to Wilfrido. 
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Even assuming, as this Court must do on a motion for summary judgment,2 that 
) Wilfrido had full knowledge of the Spanish Document, the English Document, and the Claim of 
Lien prior to the time he recorded the Quitclaim Deed because the Quitclaim Deed satisfies 
every element of Idaho's statutes regarding the transfer of an interest in property, and because 
Barraza cannot establish a legally recognizable interest in the Property, as a matter oflaw 
Wilfrido's claim of fee simple title to the Property prevails. Accordingly, Wilfrido is entitled to 
an entry of summary judgment, quieting title to the Property in his name. 
' ) 
If this Court enters an order quieting title in Wilfrido's name, the only remaining 
issue in this litigation is whether Barraza has stated a claim for unjust enrichment against 
Wilfrido. Because Barraza has not pled, and cannot prove, the elements necessary to establish an 
unjust enrichment claim, summary judgment on that remaining issue is appropriate on the 
present motion as well. Accordingly, by the present motion for summary judgment, this Court 
has before it sufficient legal and factual bases to dispose of all issues remaining in this lawsuit. 
II. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. Juan M. Cuevas, a single man, and Yrene Baez, a single woman, held title 
to the Property pursuant to warranty deed executed on June 14, 1993, and recorded in the land 
records of Canyon County as Instrument No. 9313282 on June 15, 1993. Affidavit of Rebecca 
Rainey in Support of Second Motion for Summary Judgment ("Second Rainey Aff."), Ex. 1. 
2. In August 2003, Wilfrido Cuevas entered into an oral agreement to 
purchase the Property from Juan Cuevas and Yrene Baez. Affidavit of Wilfrido Cuevas in 
2 Moving beyond the present motion for summary judgment, Wilfrido maintains that 
there are genuine issues of material fact regarding when he developed actual or constructive 
knowledge related to Barraza's alleged interest in the property. 
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Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment ("Cuevas Aff."), ~ 2. At such time 
-1 Wilfrido Cuevas moved onto the Property, began making payments to Juan Cuevas, began 
/ 
() 
r ) 
making improvements on the Property, and began paying taxes on the Property. Cuevas Aff. 
~~ 2, 3, A, and 4. 
3. On or about June 13, 2007, Wilfrido Cuevas paid the remaining balance of 
the purchase price to Juan Cuevas and Yrene Baez. Juan Cuevas and Yrene Baez then executed 
a quitclaim deed transferring all of their right, title and interest in the Property to Wilfrido 
Cuevas. Cuevas Aff., ~ 6. 
4. On June 20, 2007, Wilfrido Cuevas caused the quitclaim deed to be filed 
in the land records of Canyon County as Recorder's Instrument No. 2007043067. Cuevas Aff., 
Ex. D; Affidavit of Rebecca A. Rainey in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
("First Rainey Aff. "), Ex. C. 
5. Barraza claims an interest in the Property pursuant to a Claim of Lien 
recorded in Canyon County as Recorder's Instrument Nos. 200220593, 200666034, and 
2007007336, allegedly securing an "unpaid refund in the amount $20,000 for the payments on 
Real Estate Title." First Rainey Aff., Ex. A. 
6. Alternatively, Barraza claims an interest in the Property pursuant to the 
English Document, which was produced to Wilfrido during this litigation and identified as 
"Purchase Agreement dated March 6, 2001." Second Rainey Aff., Ex. 2. 
7. Alternatively, Barraza claims an interest in the Property pursuant to the 
Spanish Document, which was filed with the court in prior litigation related to the Property. 
Second Rainey Aff., Exs. 3 and 4. 
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' ' ) 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A moving party is entitled to summary judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(c) if the moving party shows that there is an absence of material facts with respect 
to a claim and the nonmoving party fails to show specific facts that would support the claim at 
trial. Tuttle v. Sudenga Indus., Inc., 125 Idaho 145, 150, 868 P.2d 473,478 (1994); Thomson v. 
Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530-31, 887 P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1994). To withstand 
summary judgment, the nonmoving party must "make a showing sufficient to establish the 
existence of an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of 
proof at trial." Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho at 530-31, 887 P.2d at 1037-38 
(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 
765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988)). "'[A] mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts' 
is not sufficient to create a genuine issue." Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 
( ,.) Idaho 84, 996 P.2d 303,307 (2000) (quoting Harpole v. State, 131 Idaho 437,439, 958 P.2d 594, 
' ./ 
~ ) 
596 (1998)). Where the nonmoving party fails to meet his burden of presenting sufficient 
evidence to create a triable issue of fact such that the court would grant a motion for a directed 
verdict if the case were to go to trial, summary judgment is proper. Jarman v. Hale, 122 Idaho 
952, 842 P.2d 288 (Ct. App. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 
161, 158 P.3d 937 (2007). "If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, what 
remains is a question oflaw." City of Kellogg v. Mission Mountain Interests Ltd., Co., 135 Idaho 
239,243, 16 P.3d 915,919 (2000)). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
The present motion for summary judgment involves two adverse claims of title to 
the same real property. This matter can be conclusively resolved, as a matter of law, by 
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reference to Idaho's recording statutes: First, by establishing that Wilfrido has a valid instrument 
, ) conveying the Property to him; and, second, by establishing that Barraza does not have any 
legally recognizable interest in the Property that would upset the presumption that Wilfrido, as 
the holder of title, is the legal owner of the Property. 
) 
A. Wilfrido's Quitclaim Deed is a Valid Instrument, Conveying all of Juan 
Cuevas's and Irene Baez's Interest in the Property to Wilfrido. 
It is well-settled under Idaho law that "[a] party seeking to quiet title against 
another must succeed on the strength of his own title and not the weakness of his adversary. 
Kiebertv. Goss, 144 Idaho 225,228, 159 P.3d 862,865 (2007) (citingPincockv. Pocatello Gold 
& Copper Mining Co., 100 Idaho 325,331,597 P.2d 211,217 (1979)). Idaho Code Section 
55-601, provides that a conveyance of an estate in real property must be made (i) by an 
instrument, (ii) in writing, (iii) subscribed by the parting disposing of the same ( or his agent), and 
(iv) contain the name of the grantee and his complete mailing address. "Idaho law presumes that 
the holder of title to property is the legal owner of that property." Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 
264,270, 127 P.3d 167, 173 (2005) (quoting Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 126 Idaho 467,469,886 P.2d 
772, 774 (1994)). A grantee in possession of a quitclaim deed is presumed to possess legal title 
to the property named therein and any other interests the grantor had in the property. Id. 
In this case, Wilfrido Cuevas holds legal title to the Property pursuant to a 
quitclaim deed that was executed by Juan Cuevas and Yrene Baez on June 13, 2007. First 
Rainey Aff., Ex. C. At the time the Quitclaim Deed conveying the Property was executed, 
Wilfrido had been living on the Property for approximately four years. Cuevas Aff., ii 2. The 
Deed, which includes the full parcel number and tax information and complete legal description 
of the Property satisfied the requirements of the "complete mailing address" of the grantee. See, 
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e.g., K.E.B. Enterprises, L.P. v. Smedley, 140 Idaho 746, 752, 101 P.3d 690, 696 (2005) (where 
) evidence showed that information on the face of the deed was sufficient for the grantee to receive 
mail, the "complete mailing address" requirement was satisfied); City of Kellogg v. Mission 
Mountain Interests LTD, 135 Idaho 239, 243, 16 P.3d 915, 919 (2000) (finding that identification 
of the City grantee, with no mailing address, satisfied the "complete mailing address" 
requirements of the Idaho Code Section 55-601); and see generally Giacobbi v. Hall, 109 Idaho 
293, 707 P.2d 404 (1985) (finding that the failure to provide any mailing address of the grantee 
did not deprive said grantee of his interest in the property). Wilfrido recorded the Quitclaim 
Deed in Canyon County land records as Instrument No. 2007043067 on June 20, 2007. First 
Rainey Aff, Ex. C. These facts establish that Wilfrido is the holder of title and, as such, the law 
presumes that he is the owner of the Property. 
C ) 
:) 
B. Idaho's Recording Statutes Establish that Wilfrido's Interest in the Property 
is Superior to any Interest Claimed by Barraza. 
Because Wilfrido has a valid, duly recorded quitclaim deed conveying all of Juan 
Cuevas's and Yrene Baez's interest in the Property to him, the relative priority of the two 
adverse claimants is resolved by Idaho's recording statutes. Idaho is a race-notice state. Idaho 
Code Section 55-606 provides as follows: 
Every grant or conveyance of an estate in real property is 
conclusive against the grantor, also against every one subsequently 
claiming under him, except a purchaser or encumbrancer, who in 
good faith, and for a valuable consideration, acquires a title or lien 
by an instrument or valid judgment lien that is first duly recorded. 
Similarly, Idaho Code Section 55-812 provides as follows: 
Every conveyance of real property other than a lease for a term not 
exceeding one (1) year, is void as against any subsequent 
purchaser or mortgagee of the same property, or any part thereof, 
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) 
in good faith and for a valuable consideration, whose conveyance 
is first duly recorded. 
Under Idaho's race-notice statutes, in order for Barraza to overcome the legal presumption that 
Wilfrido is the owner of the property, he must first show that he has legally recognizable claims 
to the property and that Wilfrido had knowledge of such claims prior to the time he took title. 
See Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch v. Kelsey, 131 Idaho 657,661,962 P.2d 1041, 1045 (1998) (a 
party is in good faith unless he has knowledge of "legally recognizable interest that would 
constitute an adverse claim on the property."). As the challenger to Wilfrido' s claim of 
ownership, Barraza must establish his adverse interest "by evidence that is clear, satisfactory and 
convincing." Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264, 270, 127 P.3d 167, 173 (2005) (quoting Russ 
Ballard & Family Achievement Inst. v. Lava Hot Springs Resort, Inc., 97 Idaho 572,579, 548 
P.2d 72, 79 (1976)). Because Barraza cannot establish that either (i) the Claim of Lien, (ii) the 
English Document, or (iii) the Spanish Document create a legally recognizable interest in the 
/'' \ 
\ J Property, Barraza cannot overcome the presumption that Wilfrido, as the holder of title, is the 
owner of the Property and summary judgment quieting title in Wilfrido's name is appropriate. 
1. Barraza admits that Juan Cuevas did not convey legal title to him. 
Barraza admitted in a prior affidavit filed with this Court, that Juan Cuevas never 
conveyed title of the Property to him. Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza dated October 20, 2009 
(hereafter, "Barraza Aff.") if 2. Accordingly, to the extent that Barraza establishes any lesser 
interest in the Property, it is subject to Wilfrido's ownership, which is established by Wilfrido's 
Quitclaim Deed. However, since Barraza cannot establish that he has a legally recognizable 
claim to the Property, this Court should quiet title in the property to Wilfrido, free and clear of 
any interest claimed by Barraza. 
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.) 
2. Barraza's Claim of Lien is not a legally recognizable interest in the 
Property. 
Barraza relies on the Claim of Lien, recorded in Canyon County on as Instrument 
Nos. 200220593, 200666034, and 2007007336. First Rainey Aff., Ex. A. In order for the Claim 
of Lien to have any impact on Wilfrido's property rights, Barraza bears the burden of proving 
that the lien is legally recognizable. Generally speaking, liens made by a stranger to the title, 
without the owner's consent, are insufficient to create a valid, enforceable interest in property. 
See Maxwell v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 49 Idaho 806,813,292 P. 232 (1930). Unless a lien is 
(i) authorized by statute, (ii) consented to by the owner, (iii) imposed by a court, or (iv) of the 
type commonly used in a commercial transaction, it constitutes a nonconsensual common law 
lien and is invalid and unenforceable. See IDAHO CODE § 45-1702 et. seq.; see also Browning v. 
Griffin, 140 Idaho 598, 599-600; 97 P.3d 465, 466-67 (App. 2004). If a lien is improperly filed 
as a mechanic's lien and the lien is not one otherwise recognized by law, then the lien is a 
nonconsensual common law lien and is properly subject to a court order removing the lien. 
IDAHO CODE§ 45-1703; Browning, 140 Idaho at 601, 97 P.3d at 468; Maxwell, 49 Idaho at 
811-14, 292 P. 232. 
The cases of Browning and Maxwell establish that, under Idaho law, a 
nonconsensual common law lien, such as the one upon which Barraza relies, is invalid, 
unenforceable, and subject to removal by the Court. In Browning, the claimant filed a notice of 
lien using a form "designed for use by mechanic's lien claimants," but the Idaho Court of 
Appeals concluded that the lien was not a mechanic's lien because "it did not claim or imply that 
[claimant] contributed labor, equipment, or material for improvement of [subject] property." 
Browning, 140 Idaho at 600; 97 P.3d at 468. Instead, the court found that lien purported to 
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secure a tort-based claim and that there was no law recognizing such a lien. Id. Accordingly, the 
) court found that the owner of the property was entitled to an order removing the lien because the 
claim was an invalid nonconsensual common law lien. Id. at 601, 97 P.3d at 467. 
(;) 
:) 
In Maxwell, the claimant filed an equitable lien against property for the reason 
that "the owners failed and refused to pay the contract price [for the drilling of wells] in cash or 
by note and mortgage" as agreed upon. 49 Idaho at 811,292 P. 232. However, the Idaho 
Supreme Court concluded that a claimant had no right to file an equitable lien but instead was 
required to seek relief by filing an action in court and give notice of such claim by recording a !is 
pen dens. Id. 
In this matter, Barraza alleges that he filed the Claim of Lien because Juan 
Cuevas failed to transfer title of the property to him. Barraza Aff., ,r 2. As a matter oflaw, 
Barraza cannot cite to any legal precept authorizing him to file such Claim of Lien. Like the 
liens filed by strangers to the title in Maxwell and Browning, Barraza's Claim of Lien is an 
invalid, nonconsensual common law lien and, as such, it does not give Barraza any interest in the 
Property. Because the Claim of Lien does not create a legally recognizable interest in the 
Property, even ifWilfrido had full knowledge of the existence, contents, and dispute related to 
the Claim of Lien prior to recording the Quitclaim Deed, it would not affect his status as a good 
faith purchaser. Accordingly, the Claim of Lien does not establish that Barraza has any interest 
in the Property superior Wilfrido's title under the Quitclaim Deed. 
3. Neither the Spanish Document nor the English Document satisfy the 
statute of frauds. 
The Claim of Lien discussed above was allegedly recorded because Juan Cuevas 
failed to convey title to Barraza pursuant to a written contract for the sale of the Property. 
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Barraza Aff., ,r,r 1-2. In support of his claim that there was a written contract between himself 
) and Juan Cuevas for the purchase and sale of the Property, Barraza has submitted both the 
Spanish Document (Second Rainey Aff, Ex. 3) and the English Document (Second Rainey Aff., 
Ex. 2) in support of his claimed interest in the Property. 
() 
In order for Barraza to establish a legally recognizable interest in the Property by 
virtue of either the Spanish Document or the English Document, he must first establish that they 
satisfy the statute of frauds. If an agreement does not satisfy the statute of frauds, it is 
"unenforceable both in an action at law for damages and in a suit in equity for specific 
performance." Callies v. O'Neal, 147 Idaho 841,848,216 P.3d 130, 137 (2009) (quoting Ray v. 
Erasure, 146 Idaho 625,629,200 P.3d 1174, 1178 (2009)). Under this authority, a document 
that does not satisfy the statute of frauds does not create a legally recognizable interest in 
property. 
Idaho's statute of frauds relating to interests in real property is found at Idaho 
Code Section 9-503, which provides as follows: 
No estate or interest in real property ... can be created, granted, 
assigned, surrendered, or declared, otherwise than by operation of 
law, or a conveyance or other instrument in writing, subscribed by 
the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring 
the same .... 
The statute of frauds also requires that the writing contain an adequate legal description of the 
property. See Callies v. O'Neal, 147 Idaho 841,848,216 P.3d 130, 137 (2009) (quoting Ray v. 
Erasure, 146 Idaho 625, 629, 200 P.3d 1174, 1178 (2009)) (noting that the description must 
"adequately describe[] the property so that it is possible for someone to identify 'exactly' what 
property the seller is conveying to the buyer."); Lexington Heights v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 
276, 280-81, 92 P.3d 526, 530-31 (2004); Lexington Heights, 140 Idaho at 281, 92 P.3d at 531 
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(quoting City of Kellogg v. Mission Mountain Interests Ltd., Co., 135 Idaho 239,244, 16 P.3d 
) 915,920 (2000)) (a description is adequate if the "quantity, identity, or boundaries of property 
can be determined from the face of the instrument, or by reference to extrinsic evidence to which 
it refers."). 
The Spanish Document does not satisfy the statute of frauds because it is not 
subscribed by the party allegedly conveying the Property nor does it contain an adequate legal 
description of the Property. Prior to the alleged sale to Barraza, title to the Property was held in 
the names of Juan Cuevas and Yrene Baez. Second Rainey Aff., Ex. 1. While the Spanish 
Document mentions Juan Cuevas, there is nothing within the Spanish Document purporting to be 
his signature. Second Rainey Aff., Exs. 3 and 4. The Spanish Document does not even mention 
Yrene Baez, another record owner of the Property; nor does the Spanish Document contain 
anything purporting to by the signature ofYrene Baez. Second Rainey Aff., Exs. 3 and 4. The 
, Spanish Document also does not contain any legal description of the Property. Second Rainey 
) 
) 
Aff., Bxs. 3 and 4. Indeed, the statement that "we need the ranch's address" (Second Rainey 
Aff., Bxs. 3 and 4), conclusively establishes that the Spanish Document does not satisfy the 
statute of frauds. Because the Spanish Document does not satisfy the statute of frauds, it does 
not create a legally recognizable interest in the Property. 
Though the English Document comes closer to satisfying the statute of frauds, it 
is still insufficient as a matter of law to create legally recognizable property rights. The English 
Document does not have a signature for Yrene Baez and the only reference to Yrene Baez is a 
misspelling of her name. Second Rainey Aff., Ex. 2. The English Document contains the street 
address for the Property (Second Rainey Aff., Ex. 2), but it is well settled that, under Idaho law, 
the street address is insufficient and does not satisfy the statute of frauds. See Callies v. 0 'Neal, 
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147 Idaho 841,848,216 P.3d 130, 137 (2009) (quoting Ray v. Erasure, 146 Idaho 625,629,200 
) P.3d 1174, 1178 (2009)) (holding that a description of property in a written agreement for the 
sale of real property that consists solely of a physical address does not satisfy the statute of 
frauds). Accordingly, the English Document does not create a legally recognizable interest in the 
Property. 
Because Barraza cannot establish that he has any legally recognizable claim to the 
Property, he cannot overcome the presumption that Wilfrido, as the holder ofrecord title, is the 
legal owner of the Property. Accordingly, this Court must grant the present motion for summary 
judgment, quieting title to the Property in the name of Wilfrido Cuevas. 
C. Barraza Has Failed to State a Claim for Unjust Enrichment. 
In the alternative to Barraza' s action to quiet title, he has also filed a claim against 
Wilfrido for unjust enrichment. Whether a party has stated a claim for unjust enrichment is a 
( , question oflaw. Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 338,406, 111 P.3d 73, 
\. ) 
78 (2005). In order to state claim for unjust enrichment, Barraza must plead and prove three 
elements: (i) that he conferred a benefit on Wilfrido; (ii) that Wilfrido appreciated the benefit; 
and (iii) that it would be inequitable for Wilfrido to accept the benefit, without payment of the 
value of such benefit. Teton Peaks Investment Co., LLC v. Ohme, 146 Idaho 394, 397, 195 P.3d 
1207, 1210 (2008). "The measure of damages for unjust enrichment is 'the value of the benefit 
bestowed upon the defendant which, in equity, would be unjust to retain without recompense to 
the plaintiff."' Holladay v. Lindsay, 143 Idaho 767, 770, 152 P.3d 638,641 (App. 2006) (citing 
Gillette v. Storm Circle Ranch, 101 Idaho 663,666,619 P.2d 1116, 1119 (1980)). 
A claim for unjust enrichment does not exist "where the alleged injured party has 
no relationship with the alleged injuring party." Beco Constr. Co., Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co., 
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118 Idaho 463, 466, 797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990). If a party has not conferred a benefit on the other 
) party, either directly or indirectly, then the necessary relationship does not exist for the equitable 
doctrine to be applied. Id. at 467, 797 P.2d at 867. In this matter, Barraza has not claimed that 
he conferred any benefit on Wilfrido, either directly or indirectly. See, generally, Amended 
Answer and Counterclaim at 5-6. Rather, Barraza claims only that both he and Wilfrido had 
dealings with Juan, Wilfrido's predecessor in interest, relating to the Property. Because Barraza 
has not alleged and cannot prove that he conferred any benefit on Wilfrido, he has not stated a 
claim for unjust enrichment. Accordingly, summary judgment on Barraza's unjust enrichment 
claim is proper. 
) 
V. CONCLUSION 
As the foregoing demonstrates, it is undisputed that Juan Cuevas and Yrene Baez 
executed a quitclaim deed conveying legal title to Wilfrido Cuevas. Further, there are no 
genuine issues of material fact precluding this Court from finding that the three documents upon 
which Barraza relies for his alleged interest in the Property are invalid, unenforceable, and do not 
create a legally recognizable interest in the Property. For these reasons, Wilfrido respectfully 
requests that this Court grant the present motion for summary judgment quieting title to the 
Property in the name of Wilfrido Cuevas. 
Once title to the property is quieted in Wilfrido Cuevas' s name, the only 
remaining claim in this litigation is Barraza' s claim for unjust enrichment. Because Barraza has 
failed to state a claim for unjust enrichment and cannot otherwise meet his evidentiary burden of 
proving that he conferred a benefit on Wilfrido, Wilfrido respectfully requests that the Court 
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grant the present motion for summary judgment, ordering that Barraza take nothing by such 
~) claim. 
) 
DATED this 31st day of August, 2010. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
By !~ ~ I ' 
Rebecca A. Rainey - Of e F rm 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Co 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 31st day of August, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF WILFRIDO CUEVAS' 
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated 
below, and addressed to the following: 
Robert Ward 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
340 East 2nd North 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Facsimile (208) 587-3144 
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
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ROBERT WARD 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza 
340 East 2nd North Street 
Mountain Home,Idaho 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-4412 
Facsimile: (208) 587-3144 
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SEP 1 5 2010 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
and spouse (if any), LIOBALDO GARZA, an 
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I 
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS 
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED 
IN EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN 
AS 29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO, 
Defendants. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
and spouse (if any); 
Counterclaimant, 
VS. 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, 
Couterdefendant. 
Case No. CV09-8175 
ANSWERING BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
SECOND MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, by and through his attorney of record, 
Robert Ward of the firm Hall, Friedly & Ward, and hereby lodges his Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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FACTS 
On March·6, 2001, Juan Manuel Cuevas sold the real property commonly known as 
29452 Pearl Road, Parma, Idaho, (the "real property") to Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, per 
written contract. Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, paragraph 1. 
On May 6, 2002, Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, recorded a lien with the Canyon County 
Recorder's Office against the real property since Juan Manuel Cuevas failed to transfer title of 
said real property to Defendant, Bernardino Barraza. Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, paragraph 
2. 
Prior to Juan Manuel Cuevas initiating any legal action, Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, called 
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, and requested copies of payments and any documents he had in 
his possession regarding the transaction between Juan Manuel Cuevas and Defendant, 
Bernardino Barraza, with reference to the real property. Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, 
paragraph 3. 
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, told Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, that Juan Manuel Cuevas 
was now wanting to sell the real property to him and that Wilfrido knew that Juan Manuel 
Cuevas had previously sold the real property to Defendant, Bernardino Barraza. Affidavit of 
Bernardino Barraza, paragraph 4. 
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, told Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, that he should demand a 
refund of all monies paid to Juan Manuel Cuevas for the real property, so that Wilfrido could buy 
the real property instead. Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, paragraph 5. 
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, and Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, discussed retaining an 
attorney to ensure that Juan Manuel Cuevas was fair and dealing honestly with both parties. 
Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, paragraph 6. 
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Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, went to meet with Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, about three 
(3) days after their conversation but Wilfrido refused to speak with Defendant, Bernardino 
Barraza. Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, paragraph 7. 
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, and his attorney, Robert Ward, called Plaintiff, Wilfrido 
Cuevas, shortly thereafter. Wilfrido stated in his conversation with Defendant and Mr. Ward, 
that Defendant had lost all rights to the real property per the Statute of Limitations. Plaintiff, 
Wilfrido Cuevas, further stated that he was no longer interested in retaining an attorney to deal 
with the purchase of the real property from Juan Manuel Cuevas, and was at that time renting and 
maintaining the real property since it belonged to Juan Manuel Cuevas. Plaintiff, Wilfrido 
Cuevas, said that Juan Manuel Cuevas was family, and that he no longer wanted to discuss the 
real property issue with Defendant, Bernardino Barraza. Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, 
paragraph 8. 
On April 2, 2007, a quiet title action commenced on the real property between Juan 
Manuel Cuevas and Defendant, Bernardino Barraza. Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, paragraph 
9. 
On June 20, 2007, while the appeal process was pending, Juan Manual Cuevas apparently 
quitclaimed his interest in the real property to Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas. Affidavit of 
Bernardino Barraza, paragraph 15. 
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas', own affidavit states that he was aware of the lawsuit and 
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza's, claims. Affidavit of Wilfrido Cuevas, paragraph 6. 
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, also stated in his affidavit that he was aware of Defendant, 
Bernardino Barraza' s, recorded lien and that he went to the title company to search records. 
Affidavit of Wilfrido Cuevas, paragraphs 6 and 7. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, was aware at this 
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time that Juan Manuel Cuevas could not give clear title to the real property. A quitclaim deed 
( was executed between Juan Manuel Cuevas and Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, because they could 
not get a clear title through the title company. 
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, claims that upon paying the remaining balance of his purchase 
price, he received his quitclaim deed. Affidavit of Wilfrido Cueavas, paragraph 6. 
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, does not have a receipt from Juan Manuel Cuevas for any 
payments he claims to have made for the purchase of the property, but merely an unsigned 
printout indicating someone deposited money into someone's Wells Fargo account. Affidavit of 
Robert Ward in Support of Defendant's Answering Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment ("Ward Affidavit"), exhibit 2. 
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, claims the payments he made per the Wells Fargo deposit 
printouts total $32,467.00, however, some are duplicated and others do not have a deposit 
(~: printout. Affidavit of Wilfrido Cuevas, paragraph 4; Ward Affidavit, exhibit 2. 
( 
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, claims his purchase price was $80,000.00. Ward Affidavit, 
exhibit 2. 
DISPUTED FACTS AS STATED IN PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM 
Defendant~ Bernardino Barraza, disputes the facts as stated in Plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and specifically disputes the following. 
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, claims in paragraph 2 of Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support 
of Wilfrido Cuevas' Second Motion for Summary Judgment that Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, 
entered into an oral agreement to purchase the real property from Juan Manuel Cuevas. 
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, disputes this fact. The Statute of Frauds and parole evidence 
rule prohibit Plaintiff from presenting any evidence in this present case regarding an alleged oral 
000341-
ANSWERING BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4 
contract between himself and Juan Manuel Cuevas. McGinnis v. Stanfield, 6 Idaho 372 (1898). 
('· Furthermore, oral contracts to transfer real estate are not valid. Idaho Code § 9-503, McGinnis v. 
Stanfield at 3 78, 3 79. Furthermore, Plaintiff advised Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, that he was 
only renting the real property from Juan Manuel Cuevas. Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, 
paragraph 8. 
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, claims in paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support 
ofWilfrido Cuevas' Second Motion for: Summary Judgment, that on or about June 13, 2007, 
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, paid the remaining balance of the purchase price for the property. 
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, disputes this fact. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, in his response to 
Interrogatory No. 6, stated his payments are summarized in a list totaling $32,467.00, of which, 
some are duplicated. Ward Affidavit, exhibit 2. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, in his response to 
Interrogatory No. 8, said the purchase price was $80,000.00. Ward Affidavit, exhibit 2. 
Q Furthermore, Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas', alleged payments are mostly in the amount of$800.00 
per month, and Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, told Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, previously that 
he was only renting the property from Juan Manuel Cuevas. Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, 
paragraph 8. 
( 
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, argues that prior to receiving his quitclaim deed, he did not 
have notice or knowledge of Defendant, Bernardino Barraza's, claims to the property. 
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, disputes this fact. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, received his 
quitclaim deed on June 13, 2007, however, Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, recorded a lien 
against the property on May 6, 2002. Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, paragraph 2. Plaintiff, 
Wilfrido Cuevas, told Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, that Juan Manuel Cuevas was now 
wanting to sell the real property to Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, and that Wilfrido Cuevas knew 
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that Juan Manuel Cuevas had previously sold the real property to Defendant, Bernardino Barraza. 
(--- Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, paragraph 4. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, called Defendant, 
Bernardino Barraza, and requested copies of Defendant, Bernardino Barraza's, payments. 
Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, paragraph 3. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, told Defendant, 
Bernardino Barraza, that he should demand a refund of all monies paid to Juan Manuel Cuevas 
for the real property, so that Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, could buy the real property instead. 
Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, paragraph 5. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, told Defendant, 
Bernardino Barraza, that he lost all of his rights to real property per the Statute of Limitations. 
Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, paragraph 8. On June 20, 2007, Juan Manuel Cuevas, 
apparently quitclaim deeded his interest in the real property to Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas. 
Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, paragraph 15. At the time Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, received 
his quitclaim deed, Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, was aware of the lawsuit between Juan Manuel 
Q Cuevas and Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, however Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, believed that 
Juan Manuel Cuevas had prevailed in the lawsuit. Affidavit ofWilfrido Cuevas, paragraph 6. 
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, checked the land records in Canyon County prior to recording his 
quitclaim deed. Affidavit of Wilfrido Cuevas, paragraph 15. 
( 
LEGAL AUTHORITY 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied because Plaintiff has not 
shown that there is no dispute of material fact. Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to show that he 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Also, Plaintiff advised the court at the hearing on his 
previous Motion for Summary Judgment, that if the court would declare Defendant, Bernardino 
Barraza's, prior judgment of quiet title void, this in no way would mean that Defendant, 
Bernardino Barraza, did not have a legally recognizable interest in the property. 
ANSWERING BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFQ R~~o"t~TION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 6 
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, is requesting the court to grant his Motion for Summary 
( - Judgment by claiming Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, cannot establish a legally recognizable 
interest in the property, and also that he cannot claim unjust enrichment. 
In the previous litigation between Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, and Juan Manuel 
Cuevas, the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, had 
a legally recognizable interest in the property when deciding whether Defendant, Bernardino 
Barraza, had a meritorious claim sufficient to set aside default. The Court of Appeals stated on 
page 8 and 9 of their 2008 Opinion No. 60, that the written contract between Juan Manuel 
Cuevas and Bernardino Barraza could establish that Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, has an 
ownership interest in the property and would be entitled to specific performance. Ward 
Affidavit, exhibit 1. 
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, has paid in full the balance of his purchase price to Juan 
() Manuel Cuevas with the $68,000.00 of foregone rent given to Juan Manuel Cuevas in the amount 
of $800.00 per month from August 2003 to the present. 
( 
PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGED ORAL CONTRACT 
Any alleged oral contract is invalid to transfer real property. LC. § 9-503, also known as 
the Statute of Frauds, provides that a contract to transfer an interest in real 
property must be in writing. Thus, any alleged oral contract is invalid since it violates the Statute 
of Frauds. 
Idaho Code§ 9-503. Transfers of real property to be in writing. No estate or 
interest in real property, other than for leases for a term not exceeding one (1) 
year, nor any trust or power over or concerning it, or in any manner relating 
thereto, can be created, granted, assigned, surrendered, or declared, otherwise than 
1n'. operation of law, or a conveyance or other instrument in writing, subscribed by 
the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by 
his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. (emphasis added) 
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The Court in Mcginness v. Stanfield, 6 Idaho 372 ( 1898), held that no interest in real 
(~~ estate can be created by an oral contract. 
( 
Under the statutes we are unable to hold that title to real estate, or an interest in 
real estate, can be established by proof of a verbal transfer. Id. at 378, 379 
The Court further held that the property interest per the quitclaim deed could not be effective 
prior to the date of the deed. 
The deed subsequently procured by her from Glenn, some 14 years after he had 
left the country, could only have effect from its date. Id. at 379 
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, did not have any interest in the property by means of his alleged oral 
contract and the quitclaim deed obtained by Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, could only have affect 
from its date in June 2007, which is subsequent to Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, acquiring an 
interest in the property, and subsequent to Plaintiff, Wilfridos Cuevas', knowledge of Defendant, 
Bernardino Barraza's, prior interest in the property. 
The parole evidence rule prohibits Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, from presenting any 
evidence in the present case regarding any alleged oral contract to purchase the real property. 
The exception of partial performance is based upon the equitable remedy of specific performance 
and can only be used in disputes between parties to the oral contract. Mcginness v. Stanfield held 
that an oral contract for the sale of real property is not admissible in evidence to establish title 
against a stranger to the oral contract. Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, was not a party to the 
alleged oral contract, and therefore, Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, is prevented from presenting any 
evidence regarding an alleged oral contract. 
QUITCLAIM DEED 
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas', request for summary judgment based upon Idaho Code§ 55-
606 is without merit since Defendant, Bernardino Barraza' s, interest in the property was acquired 
000345 
ANSWERING BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 8 
C-. _..,. ........ ~ 
( 
\ 
prior rather than subsequent to the quitclaim deed. 
Idaho Code § 55-606 provides as follows: 
Every grant or conveyance of an estate in real property is 
conclusive against the grantor, also against every one subsequently 
claiming under him, except a purchaser or encumbrancer, who in 
good faith, and for a valuable consideration, acquires a title or lien 
by an instrument or valid judgment lien that is first duly recorded. 
( emphasis added) 
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, had knowledge of Defendant, Bernardino Barraza's, claims 
prior to Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, taking title per the quitclaim deed. Affidavit of Bernardino 
Barraza, paragraphs 2-8, and 15. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, was aware of the recorded lien and 
the lawsuit over title, and had gone to the title company to verify these matters. Affidavit of 
Wilfrido Cuevas, paragraphs 6 and 7. Furthermore, Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, had discussed 
with Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, the prior sale and whether he should hire an attorney. 
Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, paragraphs 4 and 6. 
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, could not acquire by quitclaim deed any greater interest than 
that held by his predecessor, Juan Manuel Cuevas. The interest Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, 
acquired with the quitclaim deed is subject to the prior interest of Defendant, Bernardino 
Barraza, just as his predecessor's interest was subject to the claims of Defendant, Bernardino 
Barraza. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, has what Juan Manuel Cuevas had; a title subject to 
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza's, interest. 
BONA FIDE PURCHASES 
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas', request for summary judgment based upon Idaho Code§ 55-
812 is also without merit since Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, had knowledge of Defendant, 
Bernardino Barraza's, claims prior to Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, taking title per the quitclaim 
deed. Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, paragraphs 2-8, and 15. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, was 
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aware of the recorded lien and the lawsuit over title, and had gone to the title company to verify 
c·, these matters. Affidavit of Wilfrido Cuevas, paragraphs 6 and 7. Furthermore, Plaintiff, 
Wilfrido Cuevas, had discussed with Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, the prior sale and whether 
he should hire an attorney. Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, paragraphs 4 and 6. 
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, is not a bona fide purchaser for value of the real property and 
thus his claim to the property is not superior to the interest of Defendant, Bernardino Barraza. 
Idaho Code § 55-812. Unrecorded conveyance void against subsequent 
purchasers. - Every conveyance of real property other than a lease for a term not 
exceeding one (1) years, is void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee 
of the same property, or any part thereof, in good faith and for a valuable 
consideration, whose conveyance is first duly recorded. 
Although Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, recorded his quitclaim deed, he has not shown that 
he paid a valuable consideration and acquired his quitclaim deed in good faith. 
Furthermore, the court in Langroise v. Becker, 96 Idaho 218, 526 P.2d 178 (1974), held 
() that one who purchases property with notice of conflicting claims, or fails to investigate an 
obvious conflicting claim does not take in "good faith" and will not prevail over a prior 
purchaser. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, by his own admission, was aware of the previous quiet 
title action. Wilfrido Cuevas was also aware of the lien recorded by Defendant, Bernardino 
Barraza, prior to any court action. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, obviously did not take in "good 
faith". 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, argues that he should be granted summary judgment because 
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza' s, written contract does not satisfy the Statute of Frauds. This 
same issue was presented to the Court of Appeals by Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas', predecessor in 
interest. The Court of Appeals disagreed and held that the Statute of Frauds was not a bar to 
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Defendant, Bernardino Barraza's, claims to the property per the written contact. Court of 
(:. Appeals 2008 Opinion No. 60, page 10. 
( 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, argues that in the event the court awards the property to 
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cueavas, that Wilfrido Cuevas should be granted summary judgment on 
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza's unjust enrichment claim because no benefit was conferred upon 
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas. This is not true. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, would receive by 
quitclaim deed, all of the remaining interest of Juan Manuel Cuevas after selling the property to 
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, would also receive the benefit of all 
the money Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, paid towards the purchase of the property. 
Furthermore, Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, would receive the benefit of the improvements 
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, made to the property. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied because he has failed 
to show that no material dispute of fact exists and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. 
DATED this J!:L day of September, 2010. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that upon the $y of September, 2010, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of Answering Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment by the method indicated below, addressed to the following: 
REBECCA A. RAINEY /~.s. Mail 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK __ Hand Delivered 
& FIELDS, CHTD. __ Overnight Mail 
P.O. BOX 829 FAX --
BOISE, ID 83701 
FAX: (208) 385-5384 
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